

MESSAGE

FROM

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,

With a Report from the Secretary of War, transmitting the Inspection Returns of Brevet Major General Gaines, for 1826 and 1827, relating to the Organization of the Army and the Militia, &c.

FEBRUARY 27, 1829—Read.—FEBRUARY 28, ordered to be printed.

WASHINGTON, February 26th, 1829.

To the Senate of the United States:

In compliance with a resolution of the Senate, of the 20th instant, I transmit, herewith, a report from the Secretary of War, with the Inspection Reports of Brevet Major General Gaines, for the years 1826 and 1827, relating to the organization of the Army and Militia of the United States; with the request that the original documents may be returned to the Department of War, at the convenience of the Senate.

JOHN QUINCY ADAMS.

DEPARTMENT OF WAR,

February 25th, 1829.

SIR: I have the honor of transmitting, herewith, the Inspection Reports of Major General Gaines, for the years 1826 and 1827, together with the remarks of that officer concerning the Militia of the United States, dated December 2d, 1826, and addressed by him to the late Major General Brown.

These being original documents, it is respectfully requested that they may be returned to this Department after the object of the resolution of the Senate, of the 20th instant, has been attained.

I am, with great respect,

Your most obedient servant,

P. B. PORTER.

To the PRESIDENT of the United States.

REPORT OF A TOUR OF INSPECTION,

*Commenced on the 11th December, 1826, and completed in April, 1827:
by EDMUND P. GAINES, Major General by Brevet, in the Army of
the United States.*

THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER.

In my report of December, 1823, I stated the causes by which the navigation of this river was obstructed; and gave it as my opinion, that most of the obstructions could be removed at a moderate expense.

The efforts which have since been made, (contrary to my suggestions,) having completely failed to effect this important object, I think it my duty to refer to my former report, and to submit some additional views resulting from my recent inspection of this mighty river.

1st. It is a fact worthy of notice, and necessary to be borne in mind, that the destructive excavations of the low grounds of this river, commence, in almost every case, not upon the *surface* of the adjacent *timbered land*, but below the summit of the river banks, by which they are constantly undermined, and by which great quantities of trees are frequently precipitated into the boat channel, whereby the obstructions, called *planters* and *sawyers*, are invariably formed.

The fact is well worthy of notice, to show the primary cause of the obstructions, and that the clearing of the low grounds, by the entire removal of the timber therefrom, will tend, not in the least, to increase the destruction of the banks, or adjacent low grounds, (as might be apprehended upon most other rivers, where the excavations commence upon the surface,) but will, in time, effectually remove the cause of every obstruction dangerous to the navigation; and will, moreover, tend to retard the encroachments of the river upon the banks and low grounds, for the weight of the timber upon the banks, evidently hasten their destruction, whenever their base is invaded by the undermining current.

2dly. There are one hundred and fifty boats upon the Mississippi and its dependent streams, including such as are serviceable, with such as are on the stocks, and in part undergoing repairs. Those at present fit for service, are estimated at one hundred and ten. Many of these consume 24 cords of wood per day; others, from 12 to 20 cords, altogether averaging near 20 cords each, making 2,200 cords per day. This consumption of fuel, to continue, as it usually does, would amount to 462,000 cords in seven months; and when to this is added the quantity consumed by twenty-five small boats that usually run from ten to eleven months in every year, it will be found that more than half a million of cords of wood are consumed by these steamboats in one year. It is therefore confidently believed that this supply of timber for fuel, annually, will ensure the entire removal of all the timber on the banks of the river, in the course of a few years more, provided the wood cutters are allowed the use of the public land for a reasonable term, (say for twenty years,) on condition that they shall cut off all the timber within a given distance of the river, in the first year of their lease, and keep it cut, beyond the encroachments of the river, during the residue of the lease. This condition

will be necessary to induce them to cut all sorts of timber, much of the largest of which is now left standing, such as cotton-wood, sweet gum, and elm, which do not make good fuel, but which make the most dangerous of sawyers and planters.

TO CLEAR OUT THE OBSTRUCTIONS OF THE RIVER.

Should the plan heretofore proposed, of employing steam-boats, with their commanders and crews, by the month, for this purpose, be deemed objectionable, as I apprehend it is so considered, I beg leave now to offer the best substitute in place of that plan, which, upon further inquiry and reflection, has suggested itself, as most likely to effect the desired object.

1st. Let the river be first carefully explored and surveyed by such experienced engineers as may have had an opportunity of becoming acquainted with its general character, and let it be laid off in sections of from 30 to 50 miles each.

2d. Let each section be contracted for, *to be cleared out only by steam-boat commanders and pilots*, under the direction of the engineers, by whom the river shall have been explored and surveyed.

3d. Let no one be interested in a contract, or accepted as security for the faithful performance of any such contract, but such men as are well known to be either owners, commanders, or pilots of steam-boats. These are not only more favorably and deeply interested than any others, but they have had the best means of being acquainted with the really dangerous obstructions, and will be the most likely to remove them, and to accomplish the work in the shortest possible time, and in the best possible manner.

The dangerous obstructions may, in this manner, be cleared out in the course of two or three years, (principally in the months of October, November, December, and January,) without an expense of more than *four hundred thousand dollars*; a sum scarcely sufficient to make a good road or one hundred miles, or to build a second rate fortification: a sum which would not much surpass, even in a *pecuniary point of view*, (to say nothing of other estimates of value,) a first rate steam-boat with her cargo, consisting of a battalion of men, with a year's supply of pay, clothing, subsistence, ordnance, and ordnance stores for an active campaign; most, if not all of which might be carried on board of a steam-boat of 800 tons burthen, and all of which might be lost by being pierced by a single planter or sawyer in the middle of the river, for want of the improvements which a proper application of this sum would effect. For such is the ever turbid and ever changing nature of the Mississippi river, that no heavy articles of cargo that have once been ingulfed to the bottom of its channel, have ever been recovered.

Our fisheries have been justly esteemed by us as a valued nursery for our seamen. We have with equal propriety viewed the ocean itself as the common highway of nations; and we have, upon principles of natural law, claimed, fought for, and triumphantly defended this unalienable right, this inestimable privilege—tending to the benefit of every citizen, and to the aggrandizement of many of those of our Atlantic cities.

The Mississippi river, since its current has been conquered by steam, has become something more than a *nursery* for American seamen, and more than a common highway of nations, to the people of the Western States—it is the only outlet, and therefore an indispensable outlet, for the productions of near half the United States; and it has become a *great* nursery and a school for seamen and soldiers—a school in which there are already many

able professors and thousands of scholars—a school in which hundreds of native citizens of the west have already become able and exemplary commanders, mates, civil engineers, artificers, sailors, and firemen. These steam-boat officers and men, from the necessary habitual vigilance and attention which their duties by day and by night demand, directing the overwhelming power of steam against a current hitherto unsubdued, are in the daily attainment and practical exercise of various and essential military duties, with the exact discipline which the land and naval service alike require during a period of war, preparatory to actual combat. This steady discipline is improving in the course of every voyage. It is by no means confined in its operation and salutary effects to the officers and crews of steam-boats; but it is imparted, in no small degree, to the passengers, and particularly so to the deck passengers of every boat. These, often amounting from 350 to 400 men on board of one boat, voluntarily yield to the control of the commander, and profit by the vigilance and efficiency of his command.

The consequence is, that in the course of a voyage many of the passengers acquire sufficient knowledge of the duties of officers and men to render valuable service in various situations on board; and, what is equally worthy of notice, is, that in the course of four voyages, where there were many deck passengers, I have witnessed less of riot and intemperance during the whole of those voyages than I have often witnessed among the crews of a few flat bottoms or barges, prior to the introduction of steam-boats, in a single hour. Thus it is that knowledge, order, and subordination are steadily flowing from the great western school, of which the Mississippi river forms the theatre and basis, and the steam-boats the edifices. Their great cost and incalculable utility, in peace and in war, call aloud for their protection against *planters* and *sawyers*.

E. P. G.

FLOATING BATTERIES AND STEAM-BOATS.

The great revolution which the application of *steam* to ships and other large vessels, has already produced in the commercial intercourse of our States and neighboring nations; and the still greater revolution which this mighty power is obviously destined to produce in military operations upon land and water, and particularly so, in whatever regards the *attack and defence of sea-ports*, and of every description of military works, upon and in the vicinity of rivers and bays, admonish us of the necessity of being prepared for the great and inevitable change. For this purpose, I beg leave to refer to my report of December, 1823, in relation to the defence of New Orleans; and to that of December, 1824, in reference to the harbors of New York and Boston, recommending the construction of floating batteries, to be moved by ordinary steam-boats, and to add the result of my subsequent inquiry and reflection upon the subject.

1st. It is believed that a first-rate steam engine, will, without wind or current, propel a seventy-four gun ship at the rate of more than one mile in six minutes, or three hundred yards in one minute; and that, with the most approved sea-coast carriages, a heavy gun, say a 32, 24, or 18 pounder, cannot, after the first fire, be loaded, pointed, and fired at such an object with effect, in much less than one minute. Such a vessel could not be expected to

remain within the effective range of any one battery, more than for about twelve minutes, nor within the point-blank range for more than six minutes; and therefore, but twelve, or at most thirteen shots, could be fired from any one gun, with any chance of success, or other than random, even if the gun were placed upon a salient angle of the fort or battery, and but few could be so placed, where it could be brought to bear upon the ship, during her continuance within a mile and a quarter of the fort or battery. But as the firing of heavy guns at an object moving with such extraordinary celerity, must always be attended with great uncertainty, it can scarcely be expected that more than three-tenths of those shot would hit the hull or rigging; nor that more than one-tenth of these would be likely to penetrate a vital part of the ship.

2d. It is believed that a first-rate steam engine will propel a seventy-four gun ship up the Mississippi river, from the Balize to New Orleans, at the rate of one mile in eight minutes, or 217½ yards in one minute.

3d. It is therefore deemed to be impracticable, with all the fortifications designed and constructed for the protection of the large sea-port towns of the United States, to secure any one of them from assault and capture, by a respectable enemy, provided with a strong naval force, aided by steam, without several floating batteries on our part, towed or propelled also by steam.

4th. And, consequently, that New Orleans, with every other large sea-port town in the United States, will require for its security, in addition to the fortifications designed and constructed, from two to four large floating batteries, to carry from 80 to 160 heavy guns each, and to be towed or propelled by common steam-boats.

These floating batteries should be built under the guns of our fortifications, and retained on the stocks, under cover, and in readiness to be launched on the first appearance of an enemy. With the aid of two or three ship-carpenters, employed at each post, a floating battery could be built at each, principally by the troops, under the direction of our scientific officers, with but little expense beyond the price of the requisite timber and iron.

The construction of the proposed floating batteries, will be found to be so simple, that any desirable number of them, it is believed, whenever approved models are furnished, will be obtained by contract for not much more than double the current value of the timber for their construction. But it will take several months to provide the necessary timber, season it, and put it together; and should this work be delayed till the approach of war, our richest sea-port towns, and our best fortifications, may be in the hands of the enemy, for want of these floating batteries, before they are in readiness for service. I am deeply impressed with a belief, that there is no means of defence that will be found so formidable, and at the same time so simple in its construction and application, and altogether so economical, as these batteries, when constructed, as I presume no practical man will doubt that they should be constructed, with a view to be propelled only by *steam-boats not permanently attached to the batteries, but to be temporarily attached to and at any moment separated from them, as occasion may require.* In this case, by far the most expensive part of this species of defence, the *steam engine*, will be employed in the transportation of merchandise, and of munitions of war, until the actual approach of an enemy renders it necessary to wield these batteries against him: and even then, the engines by which they are wielded, will be kept principally out of the range of the enemy's shot;

for, in approaching the enemy, the steam-boats by which the batteries are propelled, being in the rear of them, and each battery being, as I presume it will be, near ten times as large as a steam-boat, the latter will be completely protected by the former from the enemy's shot in approaching him; and after being disengaged from the batteries, the steam-boats would take a position in the rear, where, by suitable cables, they would, without any risk, manœuvre the batteries to the right and left, and to the rear.

Without such batteries, it is very doubtful whether the strong and beautiful *Fort Jackson*, with a similar one, such as I had the honor in December, 1823, to recommend on the opposite bank of the river, at or near Fort St. Philip, will be sufficient to prevent a strong naval flotilla, propelled by steam, from passing with a force sufficient to capture the city of New Orleans. But these forts, aided by two floating batteries, such as I have recommended, are deemed to be sufficient to prevent the passage of any such force, without its probable loss of more than half its flotilla. The same may be said of the harbor of New York, Philadelphia, Boston, Norfolk, Wilmington, North Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, Savannah, Georgia, Pensacola, and Mobile.

It is confidently believed that no experienced officer of the Navy or Army of the United States, after a careful investigation of our means of defence, with those likely to be employed against us in the attack, aided by steam, would venture to pronounce either of those important posts *secure*, or even in a very respectable state of defence, without at least two or more large steam frigates, or other floating batteries; and that such as I have recommended will be found to be more efficient, and not more than one-tenth of the expense of steam frigates.

With these impressions, founded indeed upon limited experience, but up-to careful inquiry and the best of my judgment, I shall, I am sure, be pardoned for the earnestness with which I have reiterated my views in regard to this most essential means of defence. If I am wrong, I am more than willing to receive the punishment which an officer of my age and rank must necessarily incur, when his propositions are proven to be unreasonable or visionary. But if, as I confidently believe, I am right, or even if my propositions are deemed to be but partially doubtful, then I am justified in the conclusion, that no time will be lost in the adoption of measures necessary at least to test the *expense* and *utility* of the proposed means of defence.

CONSTRUCTION OF TEMPORARY WORKS BY THE TROOPS.

We have, at this time, but few officers in the Army, who are not qualified, (many of them indeed highly qualified,) in theory, and some in practice, to plan and to superintend the construction of field fortifications, or of any such temporary works of defence; as in a state of war, it often becomes the duty of officers of every arm and of every grade, to plan and construct for the purpose of immediate protection against an enemy of superior strength. Whenever a regiment, a guard, or a detachment, is unexpectedly menaced by such an enemy, when distant from the main army, and in the absence of any officer of the corps of Engineers, which has often been, and must often be the case, then this duty necessarily devolves on the immediate commandant there present, whether of cavalry, artillery, infantry, or riflemen. This is an indispensable duty, which there is no possible means of obviating, and which grows out of the circumstances and casualties of a campaign near an enterprising enemy.

It is a duty of frequent occurrence, in the course of perhaps every campaign. It is therefore deemed to be as necessary to prepare, in time of peace, for the efficient discharge of this duty, as of any other. Of all the temporary works of defence, as I have endeavored to show, none will become more essential to the security of our great sea-ports, than floating batteries. These may be constructed at every fortification, by the officers and men of artillery and infantry, aided by a few ship-carpenters; and one of these batteries at least for each port, may be completed within one year after the receipt of the requisite timber and other materials for the purpose. And this important work may be accomplished, not only without impairing the discipline of the troops, but it will tend rather to improve their discipline and enhance their moral worth.

I am well aware of the opposition which has been made by some very respectable, but inexperienced officers, to the employment of soldiers to work upon roads, or in the cultivation of corn-fields, at military posts, even though it be only such as happen to be located in the midst of the wilderness, far distant from the essential resources of civilized settlements. The real evil, however, results not from the *labor* to which some have objected, *nor from the application of this labor to the cultivation of corn-fields*, or roads, or in making hay for the subsistence of the public cattle and horses, required to be kept at those distant posts; but this frightful evil is to be found in the remoteness of those positions, and in the continued location of the same corps at those posts, for several years in succession, without change or relief. To this I may add another and a more powerful objection to the continuance of *infantry* or *artillery* at any of those dreary posts, viz: *They are too far distant from the posts or places, at which there is even a remote probability of our ever seeing an enemy, other than the Indians, to meet whom in war, another description of force, namely, mounted gunmen, must be employed*, to supply the place of infantry or artillery; and these corps will necessarily be placed where they should now be placed—on the maritime or northern frontiers, where we are most likely to be assailed by the *regular troops* of a civilized nation. “In peace, prepare for war!” This is a maxim to which we cannot conform, so long as a great part of our regular force is stationed from 300 to 1200 miles distant from any place at which there is the least probability of their ever meeting with an enemy consisting of regular troops. And should war be suddenly commenced against us by any foreign power, late in autumn, then it may rage for five or six months upon the sea coast, or northern frontier, before the regiments at some of those wilderness posts could possibly be relieved, and drawn to the theatre of war. Under these circumstances, I cannot report the troops of my command, as I should have it in my power to report them, (if posted as they should be,) *always ready for action*.

The infantry, as well as the artillery, should be stationed at, or in the vicinity of the great sea-ports, where they should be instructed in whatever regards the attack and defence of such places, where they should occasionally assist in the construction of every sort of works of defence; and it will be found to be no very inconsiderable acquisition to these corps to have received a full measure of instruction upon the very spot where the greatest trial of their prowess may soon become necessary. I should then, ere long, have the pleasure of reporting the whole of my command *ready for action*. Occasional labor, even in the cultivation of corn-fields, or in making roads, I contend, will not impair the discipline or efficiency of the troops, unless

the labor is permitted to continue for more than one-third of their time, or more than ten days in every month; for when troops have been well instructed in their duties *under arms*, fifteen days drill in every month is amply sufficient to perfect and continue them in a very high state of discipline: much less probable is it, then, that their efficiency would be impaired by ten days labor per month on work of defence; works from which officers and men would derive constant instruction, and that of the most useful kind, preparatory to actual war. Fighting is an important duty, and it is that upon which the mind's eye should constantly rest, as the great end and aim to which all our instruction and all our efforts must be directed. But limited in the extreme must be that man's knowledge of the *great art and practical business* of war, who permits himself to imagine, that *fighting* is all a soldier has to do in his country's defence; or that he has nothing to learn but the use of his legs, and of his fire-arms. Experience proves the contrary. Experience proves that, during the whole of an active campaign in the presence of a powerful enemy, the soldier of a well instructed army has generally to encounter at least ten days of hard labor, for every one day, if not for every hour, of actual fighting. Fighting is very properly considered to be the least burdensome, and the most acceptable duty a soldier has to perform, in the course of a campaign; even the idle and licentious soldier, who is often reprov'd and punished for neglecting to keep his arms and equipments in order for action, is frequently found among the first to push into the hottest of a battle, and among the last to retire,—for he will fight when he has lost the moral worth to discharge, with fidelity, his other duties. But if an army consisted principally of such soldiers, its transition from civilization to barbarism would be speedy and inevitable. The savage warrior spurns at the *labor of preparation*, other than that which his physical *daring*, and his ever cherished desperate purpose of vengeance and of conquest afford him. With the instructed soldier, fighting is the most acceptable, because it is the most novel of his duties; and because it may be considered as forming the closing scene of the military drama. They embrace it with cheerfulness, whilst the *common place drudgery* of every day for many months, and often of every hour, for many days and nights in succession, in the work of *preparation*, is less supportable, and more constantly trying to every faculty, upon which fortitude and moral courage are based. And it is just as necessary to instruct officers and men in the proposed duty, and to habituate them to the *labor* of preparation for the sublime and often long continued and agonizing struggles of a siege, as in the more fashionable and more courtly exercises—for the often times equally important, but more simple and brief scenes of a field fight.

E. P. G.

January 11th, 1827.—Commenced the inspection of the military posts in the vicinity of Pensacola, consisting of Fort Carlos, at the Barrancas, (at present occupied by the Navy,) and Cantonment Clinch, garrisoned by five companies of the *first*, and one company with a small detachment of the *fourth* regiment of Infantry, commanded by Colonel Duncan L. Clinch. Continued my inspection at these places until the 13th of January—resumed it on the 11th of February, and continued it until the 15th of that month.

POSITION OF CANTONMENT CLINCH.

Upon the brow of the first ridge of table land seen in a northerly direction from the middle of the bay, three miles west of the city of Pensacola, near Galvas Spring. It is surrounded by an extensive body of very poor, dry, sandy land, rising gradually, at an elevation of from three to five degrees from the horizontal plain, bordering the bay to the Cantonment, where it is near 60 feet higher than at the bay. From the north side of the Cantonment the table land presents a handsome plain for a quarter of a mile; beyond which is a succession of sand hills and vales of gentle elevations and depressions, producing little or no other timber than pines, in part of a dwarfish appearance, with some scattering black-jack.

Galvas Spring affords, for the troops, a very ample and convenient supply of excellent water. From this spring a navigable creek meanders between the Cantonment and bay, distance about two thousand yards, affording a sufficient depth of water at flood tide for the smaller class of coasting vessels. These advantages, added to a fine view of the bay, with a full exposure of the Cantonment to the sea air, render this position unquestionably healthy, and more desirable than any other in West Florida, for the location of a corps of reserve for the protection of Pensacola, for an hospital, and for a safe retreat from disease, in war and in peace. For these purposes it would require good brick barracks, with a few small castles or block-houses, or some other works of defence, for its security in time of war. But, inasmuch as the Barrancas and the western end of St. Rose island, form the natural theatre at which the defence of Pensacola must, if possible, begin and end; and as, with good barracks there can be but little doubt that a position at the Barrancas will be nearly as healthy as at Cantonment Clinch; it may, at least, be advisable to make a fair experiment to determine its real character in respect to health, before permanent barracks are erected at either place. Some few cases of yellow fever occurred at the Barrancas in the summer of 1822; but this may have been owing to causes in no wise connected with the localities of the place. It had been before reputed to be healthy, as indeed Pensacola had been. But one season of yellow fever has been known at either place in the last fifty years. At Cantonment Clinch, on the contrary, it is believed that no case of yellow fever ever occurred, although several persons attacked in Pensacola, in 1822, and afterwards conveyed to the Cantonment recovered—and others died, after suffering for many days at a temporary hospital, which was daily attended by their mess-mates and others, not one of whom ever took the fever at this Cantonment. It is reported that few cases of bilious fever ever occurred at this place; nor has this disease been common, or often marked with its most dangerous type, at the Barrancas.

Inspected the battalion of the first Infantry, consisting of five companies, commanded by Major D. E. Twiggs, which I found to be, in most respects, equal, but in no respect superior, to the battalion under Brevet Major Kerney, as inspected by me at Belle Fontaine, Missouri, June, 1826, viz:

Police.—Excellent, particularly so in messing, and in the condition of the barracks, and of the clothing, arms, and equipments generally in use. The excellence of the police of this battalion was, moreover, finally exhibited in the officer-like and soldierly appearance of the troops under arms, on drill, and on guard, and other duties. The sick of the battalion appeared to have been treated with care and skill by Assistant Surgeon Randolph.

The old books were found to be incomplete—new books have been obtained, but the opening of them is suspended, in the expectation of obtaining from the Adjutant-General a proper form. The general regulations upon the subject of company books, are radically defective. The number of books required, is more than double the number that is necessary or proper. The old form, in use previous to the late war, is much more concise, and, in all respects, more perfect than the present; but the single fact, that scarcely any two regiments in service construe the regulations alike in reference to one of these books, is equal to volumes of testimony to prove that the regulations in this particular are extremely imperfect. Regulations that admit of such misconstruction, are something worse than useless. But, imperfect as they are, if forms are furnished, there can be no doubt but they will be faithfully complied with.

Instruction—In theory and in practice, conformable to the late prescribed systems. This was very satisfactorily exemplified in the striking regularity and systematic accuracy with which every duty witnessed by me was discharged, particularly on drill and on guard, by officers and men. The battalion was ably exercised by Major Twiggs, and after him by each one of the Captains present, as well as by several of the Lieutenants, in a manner which evinced a degree of practical knowledge, that nothing short of well disciplined habits of attention could effect. These remarks are intended to apply to *every duty under arms as Infantry, preparatory to meeting an enemy in battle*. As Artillery, this battalion has not extended its practical knowledge beyond the common uses of the *field-piece*, which I am assured the officers and most of the men can exercise, load, and fire, with ease and accuracy. Lieutenant J. J. Abercrombie, Adjutant, discharged his duty with ability. The following named company officers were seen on drill, each of whom proved himself to be well acquainted with his duty, and most of them highly qualified to impart to their commands the results of their experience. In the relative qualifications of these officers there appeared to be some shades of difference; but not so striking in the drill as to justify any particular notice, until another inspection shall afford more conclusive evidence of their respective merits, viz:

Captain W. V. Cobbs, commanding company C.

Do G. Loomis, do do F.

Do Wm. H. Ker, do do D.

1 Lieut. W. R. Jouett, do do G.

Do John M'Kenzie, do do E.

2 Lieut. Wm. Reynolds, of company D.

Do T. Paige, of company F.

Do Nathaniel C. Macrae, of company E.

Discipline.—The excellence of *police*, and the accuracy of *instruction*, prove that the discipline of this battalion is of a very high character.

FOURTH REGIMENT OF INFANTRY.

Company "A," commanded by Captain P. Wager.

Detachment commanded by Captain W. Lear.

Police.—Excellent. The condition of the temporary barrack rooms, arms, clothing, camp equipage, and mess furniture, equal to any in service. The regimental and company books, as far as appeared necessary to examine them, exhibited evidence of great neatness and accuracy—particularly those of the regiment in charge of Adjutant Martin.

The hospital bore satisfactory proof of skill and diligence on the part of assistant Surgeon Macomb, in whose charge it had for some time been placed.

Instructions very good, as Light Infantry, but otherwise somewhat defective in the drill of the company as Infantry. The defect, however, was very slight, and appeared more the result of a want of habitual attention to the drill than any other cause. And this is too obviously to be attributed to the employment of most of the officers and men of this regiment, for two or three years past, in small detached parties in the wilderness, and at hard labor upon roads and bridges, where it was seldom possible to pay that scrupulous attention to the drill, which is always necessary to the attainment of accurate practical knowledge of company and battalion tactics. But the officers and men of the 4th, at this place, have nothing of Infantry duty under arms to learn, which may not be acquired perfectly in the course of two or three weeks, under their experienced officers; whose commands I had hitherto found well instructed; particularly so in the early part of the year 1822, and often prior to that period.

Discipline—In accordance with the "Police" and "Instruction."

The melancholy death of Major Donoho, an officer of high moral character, legal and military mind, calm, discriminating and just, who was shot on parade at tattoo, by a Sergeant, some months past, is supposed to afford proof of a defect in the discipline of the corps; but, after a careful investigation of the facts connected with that afflictive event, (for the detailed account of which, see the record of the General Court Martial by which the offender was tried,) I am convinced, that this unexampled outrage cannot be attributed to a defective discipline, except on the part of the hardened offender, who had been guilty of a neglect of duty, with partial intoxication, and who, it is believed, in consequence of a mild rebuke from the Major, acted upon the first diabolical impulse of savage feeling, without any previous concert or sober reflection. His character had previously been deemed to be that of a faithful non-commissioned officer. He is under sentence of death, and is doubtless a fit subject for this exemplary punishment.

TOWN OF PENSACOLA.

Of the old forts and block-houses constructed by the British in 1763, and those subsequently built by the Spaniards for the protection of Pensacola, nothing now remains but the foundations, with the more than half razed and ruined ramparts, ditch and glacis, of the former, with the decayed and tottering bodies and frames of the latter. However formidable the two former of these works, (forts *Barnard* and *Charlotte*, alias St. Michael,) may have been to an approaching foe by *land*, they could afford no security whatever against an attack by *water*—their location being on the hill north-west of the town, and a mile from any part of the bay, where vessels of war can approach. Such vessels may take a position from one and a half to three miles distant from these works, and yet the town, standing in the intermediate space, would be exposed to their fire, whilst they would keep out of the reach of the guns of both. It cannot, therefore, be necessary to re-build either of these works, nor is it deemed necessary to repair any of the block-houses.

BARRANCAS AND ST. ROSE.

Our defence of the town of Pensacola, as I have before remarked, must, if possible, begin, be confined to, and terminate, at the entrance of the bay between the Barrancas and fort St. Rose. Suitable fortifications at these places

will effectually command the intervening entrance of the bay, where the channel is so narrow as to expose every vessel attempting to pass, in or out, to the range of a *point-blank shot* from the heavy guns of each work; and to an effective cross-fire from each, for the space of two miles along the ship channel in the entrance of the bay. The two forts would be nearly 2500 yards apart. The one at the old Spanish *fort Carlos*, at the Barrancas, and the other at the old British fort St. Rose, near the western end of St. Rose Island.

Fort Carlos stands on the western margin of the sand-beach, west of the bay, and 300 yards therefrom, at the base of the bank or hill, on the brow of which is a temporary work erected by the Spaniards, and connected with fort Carlos. The lower part of this consists of a small but strong semi-circular work of masonry, with a bomb-proof magazine, &c. The front of the battery *enbarbet*, looking towards the channel, the flanks with embrasures opening upon the coast to the east and west.

The upper part of this position commands the surrounding country for two miles, except in one direction, south-south-west, where there are some small sand hills, behind which General Jackson approached the place in 1818.

Fort St. Rose exhibits only a ruin half covered with sand, drifted by the wind. The proposed work at this position, as well as that at the old fort Carlos, will afford direct and efficient protection to the Navy Yard, recently established about 2000 yards up the bay, on the western shore, and nearly equidistant from each fort.

ORDNANCE, AND ORDNANCE STORES, AT FORT CARLOS.

The powder magazine, though originally well built, bomb-proof, and the arch work covered with cement, together with a composition, of which tar appears to have been the principal material, is so much decayed, as to receive considerable quantities of water from every heavy rain; by which the whole building in wet weather becomes saturated, often dripping with water, and always damp; insomuch as to destroy much of the powder which has been there deposited in bad casks, and greatly to injure that contained in the best of the casks; none of which are constructed, as I have repeatedly urged that our powder casks should be, *with copper hoops*.

On a cursory inspection of the ordnance and stores at this place, on the 13th of January, I found them so much *without order or classification*, as not to admit of minute inspection, without being first overhauled and arranged. For this purpose an officer and twelve men were detailed, pursuant to my orders, No. 2, of that date.

This work was accomplished during my visit to East Florida, prior to the 15th of February; at which time I found the whole as well arranged as the decayed state of the buildings, and many of the stores, would admit of.

But, with the exception of two long brass 24 pounders, (the finest looking pieces of ordnance I have ever seen,) with two 8-inch howitzers, and two 10-inch mortars, all of brass, together with eight large pieces of iron ordnance, which appeared sound and good, most of the other ordnance, and the principal part of the stores, were much damaged by long exposure to the weather, and by rust and use.

From that excellent officer, Quartermaster Burch, (who was absent on my first inspection, in January last,) I learned that most of this property

was that which the Spaniards left at this post when delivered to the United States; that much of it was reported to be damaged at that time; and that it is held ready for transportation to whatever depôt the Ordnance Department may designate for its reception. It will be seen by the inventory ordered to be transmitted to the Adjutant General's Office, that the number of dismounted guns, with the quantity of round and grape shot, is very considerable; and that the value of this property is too great to justify its condemnation as *damaged and unfit for service*, without a more rigid inspection than can be made until a few carriages are furnished, with other means for actual experiment, in the trial of each piece, and of the powder, and the other stores. The metal of the brass ordnance is alone deemed to be worth ten thousand dollars, and the metal of the iron ordnance, shot and shells, estimated at 80 tons, is deemed to be worth six thousand dollars, making a total of sixteen thousand dollars. But it is confidently believed that all the brass, and many of the iron guns are serviceable. A little rust and rough exterior are too apt to hasten the condemnation of such guns, without the deliberate and scrupulous inspection and trial which should always be resorted to before they are reported unfit for service.

Inspector Generals and all other officers should be prohibited from reporting ordnance unfit for service, without previous *trial* by actual firing. But in cases where there may be no means of immediate *trial*, then it should be made the duty of such officers to report such ordnance as they deem unserviceable, for "*trial and proof*."

ADMINISTRATION.

Pay.—Received from Paymaster Wright, as often as it is deemed to be desirable for the good of the service.

Subsistence.—Of good quality—sufficient in quantity—carefully preserved, and regularly issued by Lieutenant A. W. Thornton, of the 4th Infantry.

Quartermaster Department.—Captain D. E. Burch, of the 7th Infantry, Quartermaster—an officer of great efficiency and worth. He discharges his duty, as far as I had an opportunity of ascertaining, in conformity with the regulations, which are adapted only, in many respects, to a period of peace. Captain Burch is, however, a first-rate executive officer in a state of war.

[*For my inspection of the troops at Tampa Bay, and other places, in East Florida, see Appendix A.*]

February 19th, 1827.—Inspected the post of Petites Coquilles, with the new fort at the Rigoletts, under the command of Captain L. Whiting, company "F," 4th regiment Artillery. The company was principally at Petites Coquilles.

POSITION.

The fort is located in an island, at the "new site," selected by the Board of Engineers, upon the margin of, and designed to command the Pass Rigoletts, within a mile of its junction with Lake Ponchartrain. With the exception of two or three acres of dry land at Petites Coquilles, with a road ditched and raised as a turnpike, from thence to the fort there is scarcely a square perch of dry land for an enemy to stand upon within cannon

shot of the fort. It is believed that all but a few acres of this island, and, indeed, most of the land in every direction, within five miles of the fort, consists of salt marsh, extremely soft, boggy, and subject to inundation by every high tide, or, at least, by every unusual swell of the adjacent sea and lake. This marsh cannot be traversed by an individual without great labor and care in stepping upon the marsh grass; nevertheless, a very good road has been made over a part of it, and covered with shells.

This fort, with a complete armament, for which it is now in readiness, (and which it should receive as soon as practicable,) with a suitable garrison, aided by a floating battery of 80 heavy guns, would effectually secure this pass against any flotilla of small vessels that would be likely to approach it: large vessels can never approach it; the depth of water being sufficient only to admit gun-boats and small coasting vessels.

Police—Instruction—Discipline.—The health and appearance of the company under arms, the condition of the clothing, arms, and equipments in use, the company exercise, with guard and other duties, all indicated an excellent police, and as high a degree of instruction, (Artillery and Infantry,) as could reasonably be required of a single company, stationed at any post in this climate, and laboring, as this company has for some years labored, under the inconveniences of a heavy police, with old, and but temporary and ill constructed barracks, requiring frequent repairs, pending the construction of the new work recently finished, but not yet occupied by the company. Many of the small arms and accoutrements in use, were found to be unfit for service. The mess arrangements, and the condition of the barracks and bunks, though not altogether as perfect, as, under more favorable circumstances they should be, were quite as good as could reasonably be expected in these wretched barracks.

The barracks in the fort, which the troops will occupy in the course of a few days, are calculated to render them very comfortable during the spring, autumn, and winter; but it is more than probable that they will be sickly in summer, unless but few are allowed to quarter in the same room. The rooms are, perhaps, as large and as airy as the size and nature of the fort will admit, but not as much so as this climate requires during a season of much disease.

Hospital.—In charge of Assistant Surgeon Kerr, whose duties appear to have been discharged with skill and assiduity. The building occupied as an hospital is altogether unsuitable, except for mere temporary purposes; when, as on the day of inspection, there are but one or two on the sick report, and they but slightly indisposed. A good building for an hospital at Petites Coquilles is much wanted. It would contribute, doubtless, much to the comfort and accommodation of the sick of this post; and, in seasons of unusual disease, it would afford to the sick of most of the neighboring posts a safer retreat than any other spot upon the island of Orleans, and it would be next, in Lower Louisiana, to the Pass Christian, which is, unquestionably, the healthiest place within one hundred and fifty miles of the city of New-Orleans.

Doctor Kerr's report contains so much valuable information, and is for the most part so much in accordance with my own views, in reference to the health, and to the casual diseases of Petites Coquilles, that I have deemed it proper to submit it with my report. (*See Appendix B.*)

ORDNANCE, AND ORDNANCE STORES.

Arranged and classed pursuant to my orders, No. 2, of the present year. None of the cannon was mounted, except two iron 6 pounders, and the carriages and limbers of these were in a state of decay, and not fit for efficient service. It is very desirable that the guns, at a post like this, should be mounted, and kept ready for action; and that the fort should, at least, have so much of its complete armament as to ensure its safety from the sudden approach of pirates, if not from the gun-boats of a few ships of war, from whose possible assaults the place cannot now be considered as at all secure.

The powder magazine in the fort is too damp for the preservation of powder; it appears, however, to be well constructed, and may become dry, when the work is thoroughly seasoned.

Pay.—The company has been paid up to the 31st of December last.

Subsistence.—In charge of Lieut. Pickel, appeared to be sufficient in quantity, of good quality, and regularly issued.

E. P. G.

February 23d, 1827.—Inspected the troops stationed at the old barracks, in the city of New Orleans, consisting of two companies, under the command of Lieut. Colonel Z. Taylor, viz: company “I” of the 1st Infantry, under Captain W. S. Harvey, and company “K” of the 4th Infantry, commanded by Captain Henry Wilson.

Police.—Excellent.

Instruction.—As nearly perfect as it seems practicable to be rendered, where there are but two companies, and where these have been long separated from larger bodies of troops.

Discipline.—Exemplary.

Notwithstanding the barracks are very indifferent, the police of these companies is unexceptionable, and in all respects equal to any other companies inspected by me in the army.

That of Captain Harvey is quite equal, if not in some respects superior, to some of the companies of the 1st regiment. There is, however, but a slight shade of difference, if any, in the police of all those companies. The company of the 4th, under Captain Wilson, is fully equal in its police to either of the companies of the 1st, and in all respects equally instructed: it is, consequently, somewhat superior to any other company of the 4th Infantry. The excellence of the police, and the admirable instruction of the officers and men of these companies, would alone be amply sufficient to prove their discipline to be of the very first order. But, in addition to these striking testimonials of efficiency, I gladly avail myself of this occasion to record a fact, alike honorable to the officers and men, and demonstrative of their exemplary discipline. That there is not a non-commissioned officer, nor scarcely a man of either company, who has not, at different times, whenever occasionally indulged with leave of absence from duty, *spent the time of his absence amidst the numerous attractions and temptations of this great city, without having been guilty of the slightest disorder or impropriety.* This fact was stated to me by one of the officers who had been for some time previously on duty in New Orleans, and it was supported by the concurrent testimony of the distinguished Mayor of the city, and several other highly respectable citizens.

To those who insist upon the necessity of a revival of the old law, authorizing the infliction of stripes and lashes, I may well appeal to say, whether that punishment has ever contributed to furnish, in New Orleans, or in any other large city, so decided a proof of a high moral discipline, in any part of the army of the United States, as that which I have just now recorded.

If officers of corps or companies were disposed to abuse the trust reposed in them, abandon their men for the pleasures of a gaming table, or a bacchanalian party, then *stripes and lashes* might become necessary, or at least very convenient, to punish men rendered vicious by neglect, and the abandonment of the officers honored with their care and government.

Happily, however, there are but few, if any such officers known to me, and to such officers I can never knowingly address myself, with any expectation of *their* contributing to *improve* or *preserve* the discipline of the army. But to meritorious men, who conscientiously believe that the discipline of the army could be improved by *stripes and lashes*, it is my duty to say, that the results of my experience, and of the inspections to which I have referred in terms of highest approbation, convince me that this degrading punishment should never be resorted to, but for the purpose of being inflicted on men rendered infamous by *desertion, mutiny, or cowardice*.

The great secret by which the officers of the 1st and 4th Infantry have accomplished the exemplary discipline to which I refer, is, *that they see* their men frequently, govern them strictly, but calmly, kindly, and justly. See that they obtain regularly, and apply properly, the supplies allowed them by law; require them to discharge every duty correctly, and be always *ready for action*; restrain the disorderly, extend to the obedient and meritorious tokens of approbation and occasional indulgence; but allow none to be absent, but such as have proven by their good conduct that they will not abuse the trust reposed in them. Then will they all, sooner or later, prove themselves worthy of confidence, influenced as they must be by the conviction, that obedience, with honesty, is the best policy. For when they are convinced that solitary confinement is the inevitable consequence of bad conduct, and that approbation and indulgence will be the reward of faithful service, but few men, and none but the incorrigible, will hesitate long to choose the latter, especially if they are commended with the care and vigilance which faithful officers never fail to bestow.

The Hospital.—In as good order as the small and unsuitable house applied to this purpose will admit of. It is in charge of an able Surgeon, Doctor Macmahon, whose duties I have uniformly found to be discharged with manifest skill and fidelity. It is much to be lamented, that this distinguished Surgeon, after being injured to the southern climate, and thoroughly acquainted with the peculiarities of the diseases of this climate, with the practice best adapted to overcome them, should now be ordered to a healthy northern post, (Fort Snelling,) where his great experience will be comparatively of little value to the service.

The well established military principle, that the *post of greatest danger* is the *post of honor*, and that the most experienced veterans should generally be selected for the defence of such posts, is deemed to be applicable to the medical staff, particularly when the enemy by which they are menaced is but *disease*. This principle has been departed from by the Surgeon General, in the removal of Surgeon Macmahon from Louisiana to Fort Snelling.

and in placing junior, and comparatively inexperienced Assistant Surgeons, however respectable and promising they may be, with their limited experience, at this city, and in the island of Orleans.

The able and efficient control of the medical department, has been so extensively and satisfactorily exhibited to me, in the course of my inspections for five years past, as to obviate the necessity of any strong objection or animadversion, such as it now becomes my duty to submit in this case.

Other cases in point have occurred; but I should not deem it necessary to make a few such cases of error the subject of a protest in my report, but for the assurance that the Surgeon General has announced it as a rule of his department, that the most uncomfortable, or in other words, that *the least desirable of the southern posts, such, for example, as Fort St. Philip, should be attended by the junior Surgeons.* This is the substance of a letter from the Surgeon General, to Assistant Surgeon Minis, dated December 21, 1826. His rule of detail should be directly reversed.

It is a fact, admitted by the ablest medical men of the southern States, with whom I have conversed, a fact which had not escaped my own observation, in reference to the peculiarities of our northern and southern climates, with their various effects upon diseases, that the most successful practitioner in the northern climate, will, on his arrival on the southern border, find it necessary to change his course of treatment very materially, before he is able to establish a successful practice, particularly at, or in the vicinity of New Orleans.

If this and other southern posts are objected to upon the ground of their being very uncomfortable, or not desirable, this is perhaps more to be ascribed to the wretched barracks at some of these posts, (and there being no barracks at places where they are most wanted,) than to the climate, which is indeed very objectionable. In this case the Surgeon General should unite with me in urging the propriety of having good barracks and hospitals constructed, such as will in a great measure remove these objections; for I am very sure that if the barracks and hospitals required in this quarter, were constructed without any more delay, and made as large and as airy as the houses of the respectable neighboring planters, or even equal to the barracks at most of the arsenals, in the interior of the eastern or northern States, as they certainly should be; then, few medical men, or others, would object to being stationed at either of these posts, though they might often be sickly, but not by any means as much so, as our troops here have often been, without barracks, or with their bad barracks.

There will indeed be tolerable barracks at each of the forts now constructing on this frontier; but no military man, acquainted with the climate, will, I presume, venture to say that these barracks can be relied on, during the sickly season, for the safe reception of more than four or five men in a room; nor could the health of these be considered as at all safe, in a season of unusual disease, excepting those at the Rigolettes, where it is believed they would be more healthy than at either of the other fortifications in Louisiana.

With such barracks at or near the battle ground in the vicinity of this city, at the Pass Christian, and at Fort St. Philip, as I had the honor to recommend in December 1823, and in March and November 1826, I have not a doubt that the health of the troops upon this frontier (where it is more essentially necessary to keep a considerable force at all times ready for action, than at any other place in the United States,) will be as well pre-

served as at any other section of our frontier, south of Wilmington, North Carolina, and this would be effected without the entire abandonment of so important a post as this, or that of Fort St. Philip; for, with such barracks, six or seven-tenths of the troops necessary for the security of this place and the neighboring frontier, *in peace and in war*, might, during the sickly season, occupy the proposed healthy position at the Pass Christian, within six hours run, with steam, of New Orleans, (a position, at which dangerous disease has never been known to originate) whilst the remaining three or four tenths would be sufficient, except upon extraordinary occasions, to guard the posts located within the sickly region. In times of unusual disease, it must be admitted, that these interior guards, if furnished by regular details, and composed, as they would in that case be, of men from the north-east and middle States, would encounter the risk of a forlorn hope; but native born officers, and men of Louisiana and other southern States, will soon be found in the army in sufficient numbers for this duty, and they will meet it cheerfully, and at least enjoy as much health as the neighboring planters, who deem the climate to be a delightful one; and who, it is believed, enjoy as much health as our south-eastern planters, between the Delaware and Florida, inclusively. But a more numerous garrison at these posts, composed of men from the north-east and middle States, would but seldom fail, throughout every sickly season, so suffer the scourge of mortal disease.

February 27th, 1827.—Inspected the posts of Fort St. Philip, with one company, (C.) of the 4th regiment of artillery, under the command of Lieutenant W. W. Morris.

Position.—On the left bank of the Mississippi river, at the upper turn of Plaquemine Bend, the new Fort Jackson being nearly opposite, on the right bank of the river. (*See Appendix C.*)

In referring to this work, it is proper to remark, that, at the date of my former inspection of this place, (January, 1822,) the site selected for Fort Jackson, was reported to be near the lower turn of Plaquemine Bend. Whether the new site is or is not equal to the first, is very unquestionable.

Police, Instruction, Discipline.—Taking into view the want of barracks, and the dilapidated state of the shells of buildings now occupied, and making reasonable allowance for the incessant labor in which most of the men have for some time past been engaged, building barracks, preserving from the *rain and mud*, the public property, greatly exposed for want of safe store houses, artillery sheds, &c., added to the daily police and other duties of the garrison, it is due to the officers and men of this company to say, that their police is as good as can be expected or required under existing circumstances; and that their instruction and discipline are respectable as artillery and as infantry.

Subsistence.—In charge of Lieutenant G. W. Long, who appears to have performed his duty correctly. The supply is of good quality, regularly received from New Orleans, and regularly issued, with the exception of the beef part of the ration. For this he pays $7\frac{1}{2}$ cents per pound, and obtains it with some difficulty, and at irregular periods; the butcher furnishing it, having by some extraordinary neglect or mismanagement, failed to receive his pay for the last year's supply. This neglect is ascribed by Lieutenant Long to his "*predecessors in office.*"

FORTIFICATION.

Fort Jackson.—Though not intended to be completed in less than three working seasons, including the present, this beautiful and most important work is in a state of forwardness which would enable us, in the event of war, to prepare it in one month, for two-thirds of its armament; more than two-thirds of the work having been constructed, and a great quantity of materials delivered in advance.

The Fort of Chef Menteur, is so nearly completed as to be ready to receive its armament, complete, at the close of the present working season; or, if necessary, in a week from the time of inspection.

The New Fort at Mobile Point.—This work is something more than half constructed, and like that of Fort Jackson, might be converted to the purposes of an efficient defence in the course of a month or two, if necessary.

The New Fort at the Rigoletes.—This work is completed, ready for its armament and garrison, the latter of which it will have received in the course of a few days from the time of inspection, on the 19th of February. Each of these fortifications, exhibit in their *location, projection, and construction*, the most conclusive evidence of superior talents on the part of the Engineers to whom these duties were confided, as well as a high degree of skill and fidelity in the mechanical execution of the work.

The immediate superintendent, Captain Chase, who has sustained most admirably, for several years in succession, the arduous labors and important duties confided to him, in these perilous marshes, under circumstances of exposure to disease, and other obstacles, merits a degree of approbation not less than that to which he would be entitled in a state of war, under the frequent fire of an enemy. Great praise is also due to Lieutenant Delafield, now on duty at Fort Jackson, Lieutenant Ogden, at Mobile Point, and other officers of the corps of Engineers that have been engaged on this service; a very promising one of whom, Lieutenant Bowman, I found in charge of the work at Bayon Bienvenue. Much praise is likewise due to the contractors, Messrs. Underhill and Strong, who possessing the advantages of a military education, and apparently feeling the same zeal for the interests of the service as if they were still members of the corps, in which they formerly served, give them advantages over every other description of contractors, of which the public service cannot fail to profit.

The work at Bayon Bienvenue will be completed in the present year. It is but a small work, but such is the character of the surrounding country, a *trembling salt marsh*, where an enemy will find scarcely a foot of ground to stand upon, within three miles of the work, and where this famous bayon is but twenty-five or thirty feet wide; it is deemed to be amply sufficient to defend this pass, to which some importance has been attached, in consequence of its being the one selected by General Packingham, and by which he approached in December, 1814, the place of his defeat, and of the great triumph of the western militia under our beloved Jackson.

E. P. G.

 THE POSITION OF BATON ROUGE.

Baton Rouge stands on the left bank of the Mississippi river, upon the first bluff or high land above the Balize, from which it is distant 210 miles, and from the city of New Orleans 120 miles. This position, in point of health,

differs but slightly, if at all, from most other places that have been occupied by our troops between New Orleans and the mouth of Ohio. Its elevation above high water mark, (about 24 feet,) is supposed to give to it some advantages as a cantonment, and as a *dépôt* over the country below, which for near 200 miles has been subject to inundation during the highest freshets, from which no part of the valuable lands lying between the Iberville and Balize, can be preserved by artificial embankments. Bilious remittent and intermittent fevers, such as have usually infested New Orleans, Mobile, and the low fresh water lands of Georgia and South Carolina, are, in like manner, prevalent at Baton Rouge, during the summer and autumn of every year.

The troops at Fort St. Philip, Pettit Coquille, and those heretofore stationed at the bay of St. Louis, though not uniformly healthy, have for several years in succession enjoyed better health than those at this post. Judging, then, from these facts, added to those which the late sickly season has furnished, I cannot but apprehend that this place will prove to be as unhealthy as any other on the river, or in the United States. Without the advantages of *health*, I deem Baton Rouge to be wholly destitute of any valuable property to recommend it as a military position. As an arsenal or *dépôt*, it possesses only the advantage of being upon high ground, and on a stream always navigable, leading to New Orleans, the vital point of defence; but, on the other hand, it labors under a disadvantage which I deem to be conclusive against it, independently of its want of health. It is too far distant from New Orleans to furnish supplies to the troops there, for immediate purposes of defence, and it is too near to that city and to the sea coast, and too much within the reach of an enemy for a great permanent *dépôt*, unless it were capable of being strongly fortified and defended at one-tenth of the expense, and with one-tenth of the force that would, under existing circumstances, be requisite to prepare it for an efficient defence against a powerful force, such as would probably assail it, as a preparatory step to the capture of New Orleans. This position (Baton Rouge) *should not be fortified*, because it is not within reach of any one of the several passes or routes by which an enemy must necessarily approach, or would be likely to approach, the city of New Orleans. An army landing, for instance, at Dauphin Island, with a view to operate by land against New Orleans, would not be likely to approach within less than ten miles of Baton Rouge, in the event of this position being strongly fortified. Hence, the fortification and its garrison would be rendered useless, except for the purpose of defending a *dépôt*; a *dépôt*, too, from which no supplies could, while it or New Orleans were invested, be forwarded to the army occupied in the defence of that city, without being exposed to the great hazard of falling into the hands of the intermediate foe, who would not fail to provide himself with every means in his power to cut off our communication by the river. An enemy *may* be induced to visit Baton Rouge, with the view to profit by, or to destroy our *dépôt*; but I am unable to conjecture any other probable ground to apprehend such a visit. An invading foe approaching from the sea coast of Florida, or of the State of Mississippi or Alabama, across the Amite and Iberville, or from the Oppelousas, by the way of La Fourch, should be checked by a well fortified position on the river below La Fourch; say from 20 to 50 miles above New Orleans; because the enemy in approaching by either of the last mentioned routes, would be compelled to pass within reach of the guns of that position.

It has been apprehended, that in the absence of a strong post at or near to Baton Rouge, the enemy would seize upon this position, fortify it on each

bank of the river, and thus cut off our supplies destined for New Orleans. But a slight view of the topography of the country around, and that through which the enemy must necessarily approach it, added to the great risk and difficulty of a European army, severing itself for any considerable length of time from its fleet and its supplies of heavy ordnance, &c., and marching from 150 to 250 miles through a country of sterile hills and boggy plains, with rivers often impassable, will show that there is little reason to apprehend an operation so fraught with difficulty and peril, without an object of a more certain and decisive character, than that of the vain attempt to lock up or command the river at a point where it cannot be so commanded as to prevent the prompt and certain movement of our troops and supplies to New Orleans. For an army landed at Dauphin Island, one of the most probable places of disembarkation east of the bay of St. Louis, would be compelled to march from 200 to 250 miles over a country intersected with rivers and numerous creeks and swamps, through which it is not possible to make a road that will at all times admit of the passage of an army with heavy cannon, particularly during a season of rain, and such high freshets as usually occur in the rainy seasons of the winter and spring of almost every year. But, admitting the possibility, nay, even the probability, that these obstacles will be encountered by an enterprising enemy, having a train of heavy artillery, and that they may be overcome during such intervals of dry weather as do sometimes occur in the winter and spring; yet there is not, in my mind, a shadow of ground to apprehend that he will ever take, or for a single day attempt to occupy a position on the Mississippi river, within ten miles of Baton Rouge. Such a position would be to him (as it would be to us) worse than useless, because it could afford him no certain or direct means of preventing our troops and supplies from proceeding to New Orleans by descending the Atchafalaya to the mouth of the Bayou Plaquemines, and up that Bayou to the Mississippi river; or should the enemy render this impracticable, we could continue down the Atchafalaya to the Bayou, leading up to the La Fourch, through which we could proceed to the Mississippi river at Donaldsonville. There is, indeed, at this time, a raft in the Atchafalaya, which obstructs, for about ten miles, the navigation of that outlet: but it is confidently believed, that this obstruction may be removed at an expense of \$20,000, and it is essentially necessary that it should be removed, not only for the purposes above suggested, but likewise to enable us to send forces down that pass for the protection of Attakapas, and to counteract the enemy in his probable attempt to approach New Orleans, by the way of that important and rapidly improving section of western Louisiana. But should we fail to open the navigation of the Atchafalaya, our reinforcements destined for New Orleans may land above Baton Rouge, (if it be occupied by the enemy) and we may march from two to ten miles around to the rear of that place, and thence to the efflux of the Iberville, where we may proceed down the Mississippi river, either by water or by an excellent road to New Orleans. In this case, the armed boats, with the heavy guns and stores, would avail themselves of a dark foggy night, and would pass with but little probability of any serious loss. Should an enemy ever attempt to establish a position on the river above New Orleans, there can be no doubt that it will be below the Iberville, if not below La Fourch. But whether above or below the last mentioned place, we have the satisfaction to be assured, from every military view that can be taken of the topography of the whole country, that he will constantly, while on that route of approach against New Orleans, labor under the imminent hazard of a *fortorn hope*,

in which the loss of a battle will inevitably eventuate in the loss of his whole force engaged upon this perilous route. To us, as well as to him, therefore, the position in question would be worse than useless; because the men and means employed for its defence would be left out of the range of efficient operations, and could be considered only as a dead loss to the service, during the whole of the campaign. Should the city of New Orleans fall into the hands of the enemy, then indeed it may be possible that a strong post at Baton Rouge would become useful. The supplies deposited there, would, doubtless, in this case, be acceptable and really valuable to us, if in any considerable quantity. But the force capable of carrying New Orleans, would easily capture Baton Rouge, and this place is too near to the great theatre of operations, and yet too much out of the line of defence, to justify the expectation that it will ever become the depository of a large supply. Besides, the loss of the city of New Orleans could never reduce our forces from the western States, so low as to justify or excuse the entire abandonment of the whole island of Orleans; but we should in that evil event, meet with sufficient reinforcements to enable us to take a position at or below the efflux of the Ibberville, where the river is in all respects more susceptible of defence from its adjacent low grounds and embankments, with its extensive neighboring marshes and swamps, than from a bluff, bordered with a great body of upland, like that at Baton Rouge.

E. P. G.

March 9th, 1827.—Inspected the post of Cantonment Jesup, garrisoned by three companies of the 7th regiment of Infantry, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel James B. Many.

POSITION.

Cantonment Jesup stands on the top of the ridge, which divides the waters of Red river from those of the Sabine, 25 miles to the westward of Natchitoches, upon the road leading from that city to Nacogdoches. It is one of the most elevated and healthful positions of the interior of Louisiana, amply supplied with pure water, with an abundance of timber for fuel and building. The adjacent land is principally deemed to be public property, and though generally too poor, for several miles around, to attract the attention of speculators, it affords tolerable gardens and fields for corn and pasturage. A position near the Sabine river, from 20 to 25 miles further westward, if equally healthy, would be better adapted to the immediate charge of the western frontier, bordering on Texas; but it is believed that no part of that frontier has proven to be so healthy as the position now occupied.

Police.—Very good, generally, and in some respects exemplary; barracks not as airy as I deem to be desirable in this climate, for the summer, and though originally well built with logs, in the ordinary way, their roofs are now beginning to decay and leak, and they cannot be fit for use more than for a year or two longer, without extensive repairs. Should it be deemed proper to establish a permanent post in this quarter, and this seems to be advisable, much good to the service would result from the erection of substantial brick barracks, with such flank defences as an exposed and feeble frontier demand, for the security of the troops and public stores, and for the protection of the inhabitants, in the event of a sudden rupture with our red or white neighbors. It cannot be doubted that such a work will be found ul-

timately to cost less, taking into view the economy of health, and of life, and the security of public property, than temporary wooden buildings.

The hospital exhibits satisfactory evidence of skill and fidelity on the part of the medical officer at this post, Doct. Delavan.

Instruction.—Respectable as *infantry*, and particularly so as *light infantry*, though these companies are but little acquainted with artillery duty, beyond the exercise of the field piece. The companies were exercised in part separately, and in battalion, viz: company A, commanded by Captain Young; company B, commanded by brevet Major Birch; company F, commanded by Captain Berryman. The battalion was alternately exercised by each of these officers. In this duty, Captain Young excelled, as in the company exercise, and particularly as light infantry, Captain Young, with his company, evinced considerable proficiency.

Subsistence.—Abundant in quantity, and of good quality. This supply has been for some time past under the charge of Lieut. Lee, who was recently appointed quartermaster, and who appears to have discharged his duties in conformity with the general regulations.

The contractor, Mr. Glenn, having failed to deliver the supply of subsistence due about this time, Lieut. Morton has obtained a supply upon terms but little above the contract price of the ration. I have accordingly deemed it to be my duty to approve the measure, which was conducted by Lieut. Morton in a manner which proves him to be a young officer of business, and of sound discretion. I subjoin a copy of his report, as follows:

“NATCHITOCHES, Louisiana, 9th March, 1827.

“SIR: I am compelled to report to you the entire failure of Mr. Hugh Glenn, the contractor for subsistence supplies for this depôt, for the present year.

“The 1st instant, the day of delivery, having passed without Mr. Glenn’s appearance, I was compelled to make a small purchase of flour, to supply the immediate wants of the garrison at Cantonment Jesup, at an advance of \$1 above the contract price.

“On the 6th instant, a Mr. A. Moore, of the house of Barr, Lodwick & Co. of Cincinnati, arrived in the steam-boat Beaver, and delivered me a letter from Mr. Glenn, to the Assistant Commissary here, informing me that he could *not* comply with his contract, but that the above named house had agreed to furnish, at prices which they had offered in their bid to the Commissary General, and which *he* stated to have been next to his own, in point of price. Not considering Mr. Glenn’s letter at all as controlling me in my measures for obtaining supplies, however, I might regard it as an acknowledgment of a complete failure on his part, my only course was to refer to, and be guided by the regulations of the Subsistence Department in such cases, which binds me to consult, if possible, its interests, and those of the contractor at the same time.

“Upon comparing the prices of the market at this place, and of that of New Orleans, with those of Mr. Moore, it was at once evident that it would be *greatly* consulting the interest of the contractor, without compromising those of the Department, or the comfort of the troops, to make a purchase at once of the whole delivery of him; but, independent of any other consideration, Fort Towson being dependent on this depôt for its supplies, and the time of their departure having arrived, forbid my pursuing any other course than that of securing, at least *its* supply, which amounted to about one half of the delivery due. I could not possibly have obtained in this

place, a sufficient quantity of provisions for that purpose, and was therefore *compelled* to purchase of Mr. Moore, as the one who offered on the most favorable terms; and from the scarcity of stores at this place, would have been compelled to have done so, had his prices been a hundred per cent. in advance of the contract price, as I could not for a moment allow the comfort of the troops to be sacrificed to the benefit of an individual who had violated his pledge to the government, and forfeited every claim to its indulgence.

"Again, it was Mr. Moore's interest to dispose of part of his stores at this place, and ship the remainder to New Orleans' market, in preference to allowing me to select particular articles in certain quantities; and he consulted his interest, accordingly, by refusing me any part, unless I would purchase the amount of the whole delivery; thus compelling me to pursue the course I finally adopted, as I have already shown the absolute necessity of my procuring from him a supply for Fort Towson.

"The *soap* part of the ration, I could not, on any terms, receive, as the quality was not such as the contract required, and having on hand nearly sufficient for the supply of the upper garrison, the call upon us was not so imperative, as the small deficiency might be supplied by purchase at this place; the remainder for the use of Cantonment Jesup, I have been compelled to send for to New Orleans, as well as the whole amount of beans required. None of the latter article is required for Fort Towson, as it is expected they will cultivate for themselves a sufficient quantity.

"I have the honor, Sir, agreeable to your directions, to accompany this report with a statement of the stores *required, purchased*, and the difference of cost in each article."

(Signed)

A. H. MORTON,
Lieut. & A. A. C. S.

To Major Gen. GAINES, *U. S. Army.*"

Amount of Subsistence Stores required to be delivered at the Dépôt at Natchitoches, Louisiana, by Mr. Hugh Glenn, United States' Army Contractor.

166 barrels pork,	at	\$10 per barrel.
466 do flour,	at	5, or 5 37½, fine and superfine.
3320 gallons whiskey,	at	25 cents per gallon.
112 bushels beans,	at	2 per bushel.
4000 lbs. soap,	at	5 cents per lb.
2000 lbs. candles,	at	10 cents per lb.
66 bushels salt,	at	1 per bushel.
800 gallons vinegar,	at	10 cents per gallon.

Mr. Glenn having failed to deliver the above named supplies, the following were purchased of the house of Messrs. Barr, Lodwick, & Co., at the accompanying prices:

166 barrels pork,	at	\$10 per barrel.
466 do flour,	at	5 37½ per barrel.
3285½ gallons whiskey,	at	35 cents per gallon.
1598½ lbs. candles,	at	12½ cents per lb.
59 bushels salt,	at	2 per bushel.
786½ gallons vinegar,	at	22 cents per gallon.

The difference of prices on said articles purchased, are as follow:

Pork,	-	-	-	none.	
Flour,	-	-	-	none.	
Whiskey,	-	-	-	10 cents per gallon,	\$ 328 55
Candles,	-	-	-	2½ cents per lb.	89 96½
Salt,	-	-	-	\$ 1 per bushel,	59 00
Vinegar,	-	-	-	12 cents per gallon,	94 38

Making a total difference of - - - \$ 521 89½

The difference in the beans and soap, yet to be purchased, will, I apprehend, be much greater; but having sent to New Orleans, as the most favorable market for purchasing, I am not yet aware of its amount.

It may not be improper to state, that had I been compelled to purchase the article of whiskey, at the market price of this place, 50 cents, the amount of loss, on this single article, would have amounted to \$821 25, on the same quantity already purchased of Mr. Moore, exceeding the difference on all the articles purchased, \$299 35½.

(Signed,)

A. H. MORTON, *Lt. & A. A. C. S.*

To Major General GAINES, *U. S. Army.*

All which is respectfully submitted.

EDMUND P. GAINES,

Major Gen. by Brevet, commanding.

To Major General JACOB BROWN,

General in Chief, Washington, D. C.

(APPENDIX A.)

HEAD QUARTERS, WESTERN DEPARTMENT,

FORT DUVAL, *January 30th, 1827.*

SIR: I have the honor to report to the General in Chief, my arrival at this place, after having completed my inspection of the troops at Cantonment Clinch, on the 12th of this month, at Fort Brooke, Tampa Bay, on the 20th, at Camp McIntosh, near Alochaway, on the 27th, and at this place this day.

The troops at Pensacola, consisting of five companies of the 1st, and two companies of the 4th regiment of Infantry, exhibit a very high state of *interior police*, with a degree of *instruction*, in company and battalion exercise, but little inferior, if at all inferior, to the best drilled battalions in service. The companies of the 1st, under Major Twiggs, are most highly improved. The condition of the whole of Colonel Clinch's immediate command, at Cantonment Clinch, is very respectable, and, for the most part, merits the highest approbation, with the exception of the ordnance and ordnance stores, at the Barrancas, which, from the late transfer of the position to the Navy Department, and the consequent anticipated movement of the *army ordnance, and ordnance stores*, reported to be in charge of the Quarter Master's Department, for that purpose, are left in a disordered state. The enclosed orders, (No. 2.) contain such admonitory notice of this, and of similar errors, neglects, and omissions, and point out the steps which I have deemed necessary for their correction.

The *interior police* at Fort Brooke, was very good, particularly so in every thing regarding the health, comfort, and efficiency of the troops. The *instruction* appeared to have been somewhat deficient, in the company movements. It is, however, due to the officers and men, that I should remind the General in Chief, that most of them have been occupied for nearly a year past, in opening the military road from Tampa Bay to Alachua and St. Affee.

The airy position and judicious construction of the Barracks, with the vigilant attention paid to every branch of police, upon which the health of the troops depend, contribute to render Fort Brooke one of the most healthful posts south of New York. The defects observed in the company exercise, were pointed out to Colonel Brooke, by me, and they were such as two or three weeks drill would remove, and I have no doubt that they will very soon be removed.

The subsistence and medical departments, at each of the posts in Florida, exhibit all that can be desired, to insure the health and comfort of the troops, in whatever regards these departments. The Quartermaster, Captain Clark, appears to have discharged his duty, at the post, conformably to regulations. The road selected by him, affords the most satisfactory evidence of his assiduity and sound judgment, in the selection of the route, as well as skill and industry, on the part of the officers and men, in the execution of the work, and particularly in the construction of the bridges.

The troops at Camp McIntosh are in good order, and being recently from Fort Brooke, exhibit a similar police and discipline, with a slight defect in the drill: but which every day's practice tends to correct—a defect which is fairly attributable to their labors, in opening the road—labors which have tended rather to affect their *appearance* than their *efficiency*.

The two companies under Major Glassell, at this place, are well instructed, and particularly so, as Light Infantry. They are in excellent health.

I am endeavoring to collect such accurate information as will enable me to report the cause and character of the late acts of hostility, on the part of the Florida Indians, near the Oscilla, in this territory. I am at present under the impression, that not more than ten Indians, (and these without influence or respectability,) took any part in those hostilities, or had any knowledge of the designs of the offenders, until after the murders were committed.

The principal Chiefs, with whom I have conversed upon the subject, express deep regret at the outrage, and promise to aid in the arrest, and deliver up the offenders. Parties of the friendly Indians are now out, in search of those offenders. Until their arrest is effected, I think it advisable to occupy this border of their country, with the troops at Alachua, with those under Major Glassell. Many of the ill-fated Indians are so entirely destitute of corn, and indeed, of every other means of subsistence, excepting the scanty supply which the sterile forests of the country assigned to them afford, that they already present the *skeleton figure* of abject poverty and extreme wretchedness. To relieve the most helpless and miserable among them, I could not hesitate to issue the inclosed special order, (No. 3.) allowing them four rations of bread, or flour, and meat, per week; which, I trust, will be approved.

Respectfully, I have the honor to be,

(Signed,)

EDMUND P. GAINES,

Major General by Brevet, commanding.

To the ADJUTANT GENERAL, U. S. Army.

HEAD QUARTERS, WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
NEW ORLEANS, *February 24th*, 1827.

GENERAL: In my letter of the 30th of last month, to the Adjutant General, I stated that I was endeavoring to collect such accurate information as would enable me to report to you the cause and character of the late acts of hostility on the part of the Florida Indians.

I have since the date of that letter, conversed with his excellency Governor Duvall, Major Glassell, Captain Burch, and other intelligent officers, with many respectable citizens of Florida; most of whom concur in the opinion which I then expressed, that the principal act of hostility committed by the Indians had its origin in the hunger and distressed condition of a small party, and their consequent depredations upon the cattle and corn of the white inhabitants, among whom was the principal sufferer, a Mr. Carr, who had indiscreetly and without the sanction of law, flogged some of the party; that this irregularity was followed by the savage massacre of the children of Carr; that there is no reason to apprehend that any chief or other Indian of the nation was privy to this act of hostility; that the Florida Indians are, for the most part, desirous to preserve peace; and that their promise to arrest the five surviving offenders may be confidently relied on by us.

I have received a copy of your letter of instruction to Colonel Clinch, of the 5th of last month, which embraces the subject so fully, and accords so entirely with my own views of the precautionary steps to be taken to prevent further disturbance, that I have not deemed it necessary to add any thing for the government of that officer; in whose discretion, sense of justice, and knowledge of the character of the Indians, and their neighbors, I place great reliance.

These Indians have been urged by me, and they will continue to be urged by the officers of my command, and they will be *forced* to confine themselves to the section of the Peninsula assigned to them. Their abject poverty and the extreme sterility of the land, which they will there occupy, are evils for which they will find no remedy but in the philanthropy of the United States. These evils, however, great as they may be in themselves, may have the good effect of shielding the wretched natives from the still greater evil of lawless encroachments upon them, by such of their white neighbors as are wont to "feel power and forget right;" for the country is too poor to excite the cupidity, or tempt the avarice of the greedy land-jobber.

That some irregularities on the part of the contractor have occurred in the distribution of certain articles of subsistence granted to the Florida Indians, and that these irregularities have tended in some cases to distress the Indians, and to thwart the benevolent views of the United States in granting the supply, there was great reason to apprehend. The beef part of the ration, for example, was, in part, *furnished in droves on foot*; and the Indians permitted to go to the droves in the woods, and kill one or more whenever they wanted.

To say nothing of the utter impossibility of ascertaining the actual *quantity* of meat thus butchered, it must be evident to every one at all acquainted with the improvident habits of the Indians, that this mode of supply would not fail to produce waste and hunger on the part of the Indians; for when food is thus placed in their power, their custom is to "slay and eat," *and waste for the day, regardless of provision for the morrow*. But it is

a fact which has borne the test of long experience, that but little benefit to the Indians results from supplying them with beef, even at short intervals of time, compared with that of a *regular supply of corn*.

This is the supply to which they have been most accustomed, and I am satisfied that two rations (two quarts) of corn per week, delivered weekly, will subsist an Indian better than thirty rations of beef, per month, delivered monthly.

I have therefore urged the propriety of future supplies being made to consist of Indian corn. This will insure to them a constant supply of *bread*, or, at least, the best possible substitute for bread. As regards the *meat* part of the ration, it is perhaps an expense that need not be incurred, as the rivers, lakes, ponds and forests, barren as they are, will still afford to the active hunter, a scanty supply of fish, or fowl, or other meat.

I shall complete my inspection at this place and the neighboring forts in the course of a few days, when I shall embark for Baton Rouge and Sabine ridge. The two companies at this city are surpassed by no two companies in service, in their police and discipline.

From Texas I learn that some disorderly citizens, principally from our side of the line, calling themselves "Fredonians," have attempted to revolutionize that section of Mexico; and have invited the Cherokee and other Indian tribes on that border to join them.

Should the Indians really assemble in that quarter, I think it will be proper to add a few companies from Pensacola and Fort Gibson to Lieut. Col. Many's command to disperse them. I shall instruct Lieut. Col. Taylor, to take care of this quarter of Louisiana.

I am with great respect,
Your obedient servant,

(Signed)

EDMUND P. GAINES,

Maj. Gen. by Brevet, Commanding.

To Maj. Gen. JACOB BROWN, *General in Chief.*

CAMP KING, *Near the Florida Agency, June 1st, 1827.*

Sir—In compliance with your request, I shall venture a few remarks on the climate of East Florida, give you my views in regard to the medical topography of this station, connected with such facts as I shall state, relative to the general aspect of the country, and offer some reflections which may partially explain the operation of the climate on the human system.

The kind of service to which I have been attached, since my arrival in East Florida, has precluded the possibility of minute observation; this, however, will not be material, as the returns from permanent hospitals have exhibited an accurate diary of the weather; and moreover, I presume, Sir, that when you did me the honor to desire my opinions on the subject of the present communication, your principal object was, to obtain, especially, such views as might be applicable to this particular section of country. The instability and inconvenience of a camping life, will, I trust, be a sufficient apology for imperfections that must necessarily appear, in a report founded on temporary and passing observation. East Florida is interspersed with innumerable lakes and ponds. The borders of the lakes in many instances, present to the view hillocks of white sand, giving to them the appearance of the sea shore. The variety of shells found on the surface of the earth, the

undulating, and occasionally broken appearance of the country, the absence of primitive rocks, and the great abundance of carbonate of lime, in a decayed state, combined with siliceous particles, give undoubted evidence that the country we inhabit is of alluvial formation.

All of East Florida is visited during the summer and early part of autumn, with remittent and intermittent fevers, the latter of which is most prevalent. The maladies occur in the vicinities of the lakes and ponds, but are much more common near the ponds. The most of these late in the spring, and early in the summer seasons, become partially or wholly dry, leaving in deposition much vegetable matter, and consequently involving considerable quantities of miasmatic effluvia. The neighborhood of the large Savannahs are not distinguished for ill health, whenever they continue generally well supplied with water. It is ascertained, that health is maintained even where vegetation is most exuberant, provided that the plentiful growth, so obvious on the surface of the ponds, is supplied with as much water as is necessary to prevent its decay. It is worthy of notice, that the lakes, but particularly the ponds of East Florida, present a most luxuriant surface of blooming vegetables, where the depth of water is from twenty to thirty feet; their transparency is attributable to a sandy bottom and subterraneous springs, which serve not only to purify these immense standing pools, but also to supply the loss produced by evaporation. It can readily be inferred from what has been stated, that no violent disease will be likely to visit, or abide in East Florida; for it is an established principle, that vegetable matter is innoxious when it does not undergo decomposition, otherwise health would not obtain, in any degree, in so southern a latitude.

The settlement of Alachua (within twenty miles of this station,) is visited during the summer and fall, with remittent and intermittent fevers; the latter prevails most in the tertian form of disease. Two causes, I think, (independently of the partial drying of the ponds) are indisputably operative in increasing those effects. First, the water in use is almost exclusively obtained from wells, and as it has already been stated, that decayed carbonate of lime formed the basis of the rocky substances on the surface; it should also be mentioned, that this pervading combination is met with in the *deepest wells*, imparting to the water a magnesian and calcareous taste. Experience has demonstrated the hurtful tendencies of such a beverage, and reason does not hesitate to assign this cause as an unfriendly adjuvant in the dissemination of intermittent fevers. Secondly, the dense foliage of the Hammocks, by transmitting much carbonic acid gas to the surrounding atmosphere, renders it less respirable than it is in the pine woods. On entering these shady and fragrant groves, a heavy atmosphere is immediately experienced, which is produced by an evolution of the gas in question, from districts so fertile. The usual refreshing winds from the north-east and south-east, are obstructed in the passage from the Gulf of Mexico, and consequently these heavy fogs, which remain suspended, over low situations, are not as quickly dissipated as they would be by an uninterrupted breeze. From such a state of things it must follow, that the atmosphere being less elastic, the fogs of longer duration, and the refreshing winds intercepted, the existing marsh effluvia is rendered more deleterious in its effects, whilst the system being lowered in its vitality cannot so effectually resist the intrusion of inimical agents. Every section of East Florida, is happily saved from aggravated bilious disease, by the torrents of rain, (accompanied with vivid lightning) which fall at intervals in the months of July, August, and September, refreshing the highlands

and literally inundating the low. This is most fortunate; for, under an opposite order of nature in the months just mentioned, disease would ravage the country, and carry to the inhabitants desolation and death. The system in the months aforesaid, is peculiarly obnoxious to disease, having been previously debilitated and rendered excitable by its exposure to protracted vernal and summer heats. As every respectable theory in medicine, admits the doctrine of predisposition to be correct, I can the more unhesitatingly repose confidence in my conclusion. It should be observed, that although heat and moisture in their usual alternations, produce and propagate the various types of endemic and epidemic diseases, yet an excess of the latter agent will so dilute the miasmatic poison, as to divest it of its destructive qualities. This takes place when the rainy season is marked by plentiful showers.

Camp King is situated within one mile of the Indian Agency. The location and its vicinity is elevated and airy; there are neither lakes, ponds nor lagoons near it. It is in the pine woods. The water which supplies the troops at this post, is light, clear and digestible. It appears to be free from any combination with mineral or earthly substances, and is running. Having no thermometer, I cannot speak precisely of its temperature, but I can say, from experience, that it is salubrious, although I have not had the means of testing it chemically.

Nothing can be more injurious in this climate, than exposure to the sun; for, whilst we run the risk of (what the French call) a *coup de soleil*, we may consecutively receive the *coup de grace*! But to treat the subject more seriously, I would remark, that as the prevailing winds in the spring and summer, come cool from the Gulf, it is not unusual to experience a sensation of chilliness, the very moment debility is felt from the sun's ardent rays. The freshness of the nights in this latitude, was, no doubt, designed by nature to indemnify us for the ardour of the day. It is pleasant and invigorating, but an exposure to the heavy dews, must ever be productive of pernicious consequences. The skin is a highly sensitive and important organ, and if its action and excitement be suddenly impaired, by the sedative effects of cold, particularly when combined with moisture, it is not difficult for the medical philosopher to conceive, how other organs by consentaneous association, may be impaired in their functions. Such an infraction of the laws governing the whole animal economy, would most probably direct its greatest injury to the liver and lungs, producing an inflammatory pectoral disease. Intermittent or remittent fevers, and possibly both, in combination with the first affection. Predisposition, the season of the year, a peculiar constitution, with other circumstances, would determine the nature of the attack. It has been asserted by some theorist, that heat in itself is inadequate to the production of a regular fever, and by most persons, that no bilious fever could exist without marsh effluvia. Be these questions decided as they may, it is very certain that a rapid transition from heat to cold, and *vice versa*, is capable of inducing baneful consequences.

Though the facts I have stated have been lightly considered and feebly elucidated, it may from them be fairly reduced, that the climate of East Florida is generally healthful. If the doctrine of *ex-principiis nascitur probabilitas, ex-factis vere veritas* be a just one, I am, perhaps, in my conjectures, not far removed from the line of the truth. At all events, Sir, if I have afforded you, in any degree, the information you contemplated in your request, I shall be more than compensated for the development of my thoughts,

and greatly flattered by the favorable reception which you may condescend to give to this communication; and can add, that although *felix qui potuit rerum conquesure casus* will probably never be applied to me, yet do I believe, that a very inferior light thrown on so interesting a subject as climate, and its influences on the human system, often serves to awaken human knowledge.

(Signed,)

ALFRED ELWES,

Assistant Surgeon, U. S. Army.

To Major Gen. E. P. GAINES,

Commanding Western Department.

P. S. The present communication has been deferred with a view to obtain experimental knowledge of this location. In connexion, therefore, with the remarks relative to the topography of Camp King, the following may be inserted after the word *airy*. The country for many miles in the vicinity is high and free from the causes of disease which I have enumerated; and since our arrival here in the early part of March, there have been but a few cases of very mild intermittent fever, which were probably not produced by any thing offensive in the climate. The troops have enjoyed remarkable health, and I think there exists no cause which should produce the anticipation of sickness.

CAMP KING, FLORIDA, *June 20th, 1827.*

SIR: The Ocklawaha River, before its junction with the Spring Run, is not more than ten yards in width, and contains about one-third as much as the latter, which is nearly of the same breadth. The River seems not to be much enlarged by this accession of water, but receiving its character from the Spring Run, which is very deep and clear, is seldom less than eight feet, and frequently fifteen or twenty in depth—this depth continuing for some miles, as well as its transparency. The bottom is, however, very irregular. The guide twice directed to take what I conceived to be not the main channel. Upon enquiry, he informed me that the larger streams dissipated themselves in the swamps. This I did not then credit; however, I followed his direction whilst descending, resolving to ascend the largest stream. This I did, but was obliged, ultimately, to make use of two very narrow and shallow passes; and although I carefully examined the shore, which was between me and the larger body of water, I could not discover any stream which I supposed was the one I was in search of. Small streams are continually running into and out of the channel, so that within a few miles it may vary from ten to twenty or thirty yards in width, and from two feet to six or eight in depth, and conversely.

The water in the narrow passes was less than two feet; frequently the boats, which drew less than a foot, got fast in the mud or sand, as it might happen. One of the places through which I was compelled to pass, is not more than nine or ten feet wide, and two deep; 'tis a mere cut off, perhaps twenty yards in length; a longer passage is close by this, but at present, there are not more than five or six inches of water in it. For half a mile above, and some distance below, the stream is very narrow and quite shallow, and here and elsewhere the river is very difficult to navigate, even with canoes, from the short and frequent bends, and the rapidity of its current,

sometimes running directly (perpendicularly) upon the bank, and with such velocity that the boats with no little difficulty, are kept off the shore with poles, oars being here useless. Generally there is too great a depth of water or of mud to use setting poles.

The highest water marks I saw were a little more than three feet; but the more distinct, and where the water appears to continue the longest time, are about two feet above the present level.

Signed:

J. D. SEARIGHT,
Lt. 4th Infantry.

Capt. J. M. GLASSELL,
Commanding Camp King.

P. S. A passage for boats has been made from the St. John's to the landing place, three miles from Camp King.

Signed:

J. D. S.

(APPENDIX B.)

PETITES COQUILLES, *February 20, 1827.*

In reporting the state of the hospital department, and the nature of the prevalent diseases at this post, agreeably to your order, verbally delivered on the nineteenth of the present month, it is with pleasure I am enabled to represent the station as having been exempt from the usual diseases incidental to this climate. No portion of this State, or indeed section of country, has, in a greater degree, enjoyed the blessing of health, not alone during the last past season, but its general character entitles it to the permanent reputation of as healthful and salubrious a position as this latitude affords. The summer of 1824 constitutes the only season which can be adduced in opposition; and throughout the country at that period, those places which had been, and still continue to be, remarkable for salubrity suffered by visitation of diseases, whilst the usually afflicted sections enjoyed a perfect or partial exemption. So far, then, from the circumstance of the summer of 1824 being sickly, militating injuriously to the healthfulness of this position, its tendency is directly to confirm it. Since the first of July, 1826, the day on which I entered upon duties at this place, the average daily number of cases in hospital did not exceed three, and at no period did my mornings' report to the commanding officer contain more than six. On several occasions during my attendance here, the hospital has been without a solitary patient, as was the case even in the month of August, as also, on your visit to this place in your tour of inspection, there being only two instances of indisposition at that time, and of so unimportant a nature as to have been allowed to remain in quarters. But one death has occurred in the company since my vocation here, which was of a private, who died with rheumatism of the stomach. The greater proportion of the cases that occurred, are not, however, chargeable as being incidental to the post, but owed their origin to different causes than are necessarily connected with the climate. Those diseases that are individually most frequent in occurrence, and originate as consequences of this locality, are intermittent and remittent bilious fevers and dysentery, but the instances of these which have fallen under my care, so far from manifesting any inveteracy of form or malignancy of type, were mild in nature and of easy management, yielding, with perfect readiness, to the proper

course of practice. Surrounded, as we are, by so great a quantity of vegetable production, the miasma, from whose decay is so prolific in engendering disease, it is only matter of surprise that we have escaped with the milder shades of fever. Attention to the post and its immediate vicinity, in a preventive point of view, may do much in diminishing the sources of infectious effluvia, and it is unquestionably to that, in a very great degree, we are indebted for exemption from fevers of a malignant type. No sooner than the abundant vegetation will allow, and ere decay begins to diffuse its noxious miasms, it is fired and consumed, and we are at once freed from what is principally to be apprehended. Although, by this precautionary mean, this post has hitherto been so fortunate as to have escaped the more eventuate forms of fever, still so extensive is the generating vicinity that it is only practicable to prevent a concentration of deleterious atmosphere. As to the more disseminating exhalations arising here and there from occasional decompositions, it is impossible to prevent, and hence the milder forms of intermittent and remittent bilious fevers, to which this place will as long be subject as vegetation is so luxuriantly abundant.

When I succeeded to the charge of the hospital stores and medicines, they were not only in the utmost confusion, but deficient in quantity and indifferent in quality. Many of the articles had been, for a long time on hand, and were damaged by incautious exposure. They, at present, are regularly assorted, and, from confusion, reduced to order. It is too late, however, to redeem, or be of benefit to many, and I only await the reception of a new supply to condemn those articles without active properties. Already have I relieved the store-room of many that were perfectly inert, but refrained from more extensive condemnation till the arrival of supplies. I was unwilling, unless necessity had imperiously demanded it, to supply the deficiencies otherwise than through the Apothecary's department and the prescribed time, and in customary manner. The state of the post being so salubrious allowed this temporizing plan, and on the first of January, of the present year, I forwarded to the Surgeon General, in conformity with the army regulations, my annual requisition for medicines and hospital stores.

The time is near at hand, when, by reasonable calculation, they may be expected to arrive; and, when they shall be received, all deficiencies which at present exist will be supplied, and the medical arm of the service at this post, so far as regards medicines and stores, will be in perfect order. The Surgeon's instruments are in unity with the stores, defective in number and in bad repair, which, in like manner, will be remedied by an arrival from the Apothecary's department. Although, Sir, I do not intend to assume the liberty of suggesting any improvement to the arrangement at present in effect, for supplying the military posts with hospital stores, I cannot refrain from remarking the singular incongruity in the necessity under which Surgeons in this State particularly lie, in obtaining from New York, sugar, rice, coffee, molasses, &c., which are the staple articles of Louisiana.

Owing to some repairs which are making in the barracks at the new fort, it became necessary that this hospital be surrendered to the occupation of the company, and the mess room has since afforded a convenient receptacle for the sick. But this arrangement must be of short duration, inasmuch as the repairs are nearly finished. It will then be, in course, that the hospital will again return to its own proper use. The dilapidated condition of the building, renders it totally unfit for the purpose for which it is intended. Its ruinous state precludes the propriety of repair, and the only remedy

will be found in the erection of a new hospital. With this view, an estimate of the expense has been prepared by Captain Chase, of the Corps of Engineers, and either forwarded to Washington, or is retained till called for. The convenience and comfort of the sick call loudly for a new building.

I have thus, Sir, as circumstantially as you desired, represented the present condition of the medical arm of the service of this post, together with the nature of diseases.

I am Sir, your obedient servant,

R. E. KERR,

Assistant Surgeon U. S. Army.

Major General GAINES,

Commanding Western Department.

(APPENDIX C.)

NEW ORLEANS.

The city of New Orleans, destined soon to become the great emporium of more than a moiety of the population and wealth of the United States, has already assumed a commercial and political aspect, which renders the subject of its defence in the highest degree important, not only to the western States, but equally so to the whole Union. A plan for the permanent defence of this city, with the maritime frontier of Louisiana, having been regularly prepared by the Board of Engineers, and approved by the President of the United States, and the construction of the requisite works commenced, one of them indeed nearly completed, it might not be deemed proper, under present circumstances, for me to suggest any material change; and indeed, when it is recollected that three out of four of the principal sites embraced in this plan, are designed for the defence of three out of four of the principal passes designated by me in my communication to the Department of War, dated at Pittsburg, December 24th, 1814, by which I, at that time, as I have long previous, and subsequent to that time, considered the city of New Orleans to be most assailable, it will be seen that the Engineers have but confirmed me in my opinion, as far as it relates to the defence of those passes. The fourth site is likewise well selected, and I am convinced that the country affords no positions better adapted to the permanent defence and security of the city, than each of those selected.

The position of New Orleans is, in some respects, stronger, and by nature more secure from external danger, than any one of the great Atlantic cities.

1st. Because it is impossible for a naval force, with ships of the line, or even frigates, to co-operate with an invading army, or to take and maintain a position within co-operating distance, or within less than sixty miles of the city.

2d. Because no such naval force could find a safe harbor where they could land an army under cover of their fire, short of Dauphin island, or Pensacola, near 200 miles distant.

3d. Because the enemy's force, after its disembarkation, would be compelled to approach the city by one, two, or three, of five different passes, upon all but one of which, he would be exposed to the hazard of passing by land, (independent of the powerful works about to be constructed) some narrow defiles, formed principally by impassable morasses, creeks and la-

goons, where any given number of sharp shooters, with a few field pieces, a temporary battery and breastwork, would check the approach of, and overpower more than double their numbers.

I think it my duty, however, to suggest the propriety of an additional work of at least eighty heavy guns, to be erected at the upper end of Plaquemine bend, at or near the site where Fort St. Philip now stands. Fort St. Philip, though the most efficient of the old defences of Louisiana, is in a state of dilapidation, and not susceptible of such improvement by repairs, as to sustain itself with the largest garrison that could be put into it, against any respectable land and naval assailant, resolved at all hazards to ascend the river.

The importance of this position, can be correctly estimated, only by taking into view the practicable and probable change which the application of steam to vessels comprehending a military and naval flotilla, must produce in a river navigation, and particularly so in ascending the rapid current of the Mississippi. Without a strong work at this position, I am of opinion that 200 steam boats, (armed and fortified as they may be, in such a manner as to give great security to their machinery and cargo) carrying the requisite supply of ordnance and stores, with an army of 75,000 men, might, by selecting a dark night or foggy morning, pass the intended work on the right bank of the river, in the course of two hours, without sustaining a loss of more than one tenth of their number. But with the proposed work, within less than 2,000 yards of that on the right, the hazard of such an attempt on the part of the enemy, I should estimate at not less than *four-tenths* of their number. And it is not to be apprehended that any experienced commander would be likely to engage, voluntarily, in an enterprise where the passage of the first barrier, sixty miles distant from the main point of attack, must, in all human probability, cost him near four-tenths of his force, more especially when it is recollected, that he must calculate upon considerable annoyance from the temporary batteries and light artillery, after effecting this perilous passage, at every step in the last forty miles of his intended movement; for this purpose, the *levees* already formed on each bank of the river, for the most part of the last mentioned distance, form complete breastworks and parapets. This formidable species of annoyance, added to the difficulty of ascending the rapid current of the river, might have been relied on as the principal means of defence, prior to the application of steam to river navigation. But it is not to be forgotten, that irresistible as the current has heretofore been without the aid of wind, steam-boats are now known to ascend the river with more celerity than an army, not mounted, can possibly move by land. Hence it is apprehended, that the city cannot be rendered secure from the approach of an enemy by this channel, until we are prepared to give him the *deadly blow* at St. Philip.

The steam flotilla having once passed this position, would, in twelve hours time, land its forces at or near New Orleans; and by taking advantage of a dark night, would, in a great measure, baffle the efforts of any force that would be likely to have charge of the temporary defence of the river between St. Philip and the city.

By examining the chart of the river, in connexion with the positions in question, it will be found that such is the character of the Plaquemine bend near to, and between the two positions, that vessels passing the one on the right, are compelled to ascend a distance of near a mile in an almost direct line towards that on the left. A flotilla would therefore be exposed to a most

destructive *raking* fire from the latter, during a great part of the time it would occupy in passing the bend. But the great means of utility in the two works, would consist in the destruction and appalling effect of their combined *cross fire*. Hence it is that two works thus situated, are deemed to be more efficient in defending a pass of this description, than four of equal magnitude, not in supporting distance of each other.

It may be doubted whether the great number of steam-boats necessary to form such a flotilla, could be brought to any one point on our coast, particularly to the Balize, and there prepared for action without our being apprised of their destination, in time to provide ample temporary means of defence between the city and Plaquemine bend, for their destruction. I admit that *timely notice* of the place of rendezvous, and the real route or pass of approach would enable us to detach force and prepare such temporary works of defence as would secure that particular pass. But it is well known that no vessels can be moved with more facility, even by sea, than steam-boats; that they may be built and receive their armament and stores on the Mexican or South American coast, or one of the West India islands, and guarded by a strong fleet, may be in the Mississippi before we are apprised of their movement, or even of their existence. They may rendezvous in that river near the Balize, make a point on our positions at Plaquemine bend, and as soon as they find that our principal force from the city shall have been detached down the river to meet them, they may, in 18 hours, move round by the pass Rigolette, and arrive at Fort St. John's before the detachments sent down the Mississippi would be likely to receive information of the departure of the flotilla from the Balize. From Fort St. John's to the city, is about six miles, by the way of the bayou and canal, both narrow, shallow, and boggy. There is a small road along the margin of the bayou, but which is bordered on each side by deep cypress swamps, covered with bushy woods, vines, and briars, through which I have found it extremely difficult to pass on foot, without being swamped in the mud above the tops of my boots. The native hunters of the city and its vicinity, occasionally wade through this morass in pursuit of wild fowl and other animals, with which it abounds; but some of these hunters have assured me that they found it a work of great labor and difficulty to pass in half a day from lake Ponchartrain, directly through the swamp, to the dry or cultivable land on the Mississippi river, near to New Orleans, which, on a direct line, is estimated at something more than three miles. I am well aware that an army consisting of light troops, ought to effect a passage over any swamp that could be traversed by a single individual; this, I am convinced, would be effected by United States' light infantry and riflemen, because they would consist principally of expert woodsmen and hunters. But without underrating the character of European troops, whose bravery and enterprise I cannot doubt, it may well be questioned whether they would, under any circumstances, attempt to pass a swamp which must necessarily separate their light troops (who alone could possibly effect the passage) from the main body of their force, with all their ordnance and military stores. Taking into view the apparent facility with which the pass by St. John's may be defended, as also that by land from Chef Menteur, and that by Grand Terre, as well as that by which the British army advanced in December, 1814, added to the great risk and difficulty that must always attend any attempt on the part of an invading foe, to penetrate the swamps bordering on each of these routes, and lying every where between the lake and the river, I should think the probability of an attack by either

of these routes, extremely remote, were it not that the known absence of a competent force from the city, should prompt the enemy to attempt a coup de main, as, without a great deficiency in our force and preparations, he could not calculate on any thing less than the loss of a moiety of his force, with the greater part of his artillery, ammunition, and other military stores, in an attack by either of the four last mentioned routes, leaving every thing in this case to depend, ultimately, on the hazardous issue of a conflict between the shattered remnant of his army, and our fresh reserve near the city, where a moment's recollection of the scenes of the 23d December, 1814, and 8th January, 1815, would sufficiently indicate the result, and hasten the fatal catastrophe to which the invading foe should be doomed.

Had the British commander, in 1814, entered the Mississippi with his army, transports, and such naval force as the river would admit, and thus possessed himself of the means of ascending, and of landing his troops at and above St. Philip, he might then, without the aid of steam-boats, have moved up with near double the moral and physical power of assault that he had on the 8th January, 1815. His naval force would have given him the advantage of choosing whichever road and levee he had seen fit, on which to place his army in their approach and co-operation towards the city; for it will be recollected that, at that time, there was a road and levee on each bank of the river for near thirty miles immediately below the city. These have since been greatly improved, and extended still lower down. The enemy's great superiority in naval force, as well as in artillery, would, at that time, have given him such complete command of the river, that he could not only have thrown his army across from levee to levee, at any place within a few hours, and with but little risk, but could moreover have rendered it extremely difficult, if not absolutely impossible, for our detachments to cross in time, and in sufficient force to keep him in check. Had he adopted this plan, it can hardly be doubted that he would have taken Fort St. Philip by assault, without much delay or loss; that his next and only conflict would have been at or near the city, and that nothing short of an army on each bank of the river, equal in strength to that under Major General Jackson on the left, could have preserved the city; and without extending this view of the subject to the utmost verge of probability, I may add, that even with such equal means of defence on each bank, seven miles below the city, a strong favorable wind, with the aid of a dark night, might have waisted the enemy's flotilla to the city, without the probability of such a loss as would have discouraged the enterprise. But an army, under these circumstances, aided with a flotilla of steam-boats, would pass such positions in the dark with very little risk. The intended work on the right of Plaquemine bend, will, it is believed, be able, from its number and caliber of guns, to give to a passing flotilla more than six times as much resistance and annoyance as the whole of General Jackson's artillery on the 8th January, 1815, could have given; yet, without the proposed work on the left of the bend at St. Philip, I cannot but apprehend that this pass will be the one by which New Orleans will be most likely to be assailed. The proposed position at St. Philip should therefore be strongly fortified. We should then, aided by our flotilla, secure, to a moral certainty, the command of this important key to the city of New Orleans. In this event, should the city fall into the hands of an enemy, approaching it by any other route, his success would avail him little or nothing, so long as we should retain the complete command of the river, which these two positions, strongly fortified, would give us, if not for years, at least for

months, until the requisite forces of the western states, irresistible as the mighty stream on whose tributaries they dwell, and on whose bosom they would be wafted to the scene of action, would assemble and sweep from its shores the invading foe.

The route by Attacapas appears to merit more attention than I have been able to devote to it. An enemy landing on that coast, or in Texas, would be able to sustain himself longer, as he could obtain a better supply of fresh provisions, horses, oxen, forage, &c. &c., and could more effectually command the passes through which our troops must approach him, than at any place within our limits on the Gulf or Bay of Mexico; hence he could effect an important diversion, divide our forces, and at the same time co-operate powerfully with that part of his army that might be employed against the city, by either of the other routes.

To prepare Louisiana for a state of war, I deem it proper to suggest the propriety of constructing substantial brick barracks for the accommodation of one thousand men, at the battle ground, seven miles below, or from 10 to 20 miles above the city of New Orleans, with spacious quarter-master, subsistence, and ordnance stores; and that similar barracks be constructed at the Pass Christian.

The first mentioned barracks are deemed to be essentially necessary for the health and comfort of such corps, as the probable disorders of a bad population, may from time to time require to be near the city, and on the appearance of war, these barracks would be ready for the reception of a part of the corps of reserve, (and for the sick and wounded of the army,) which during the season of military operations at that place, from the 15th November to the 15th June, should be held ready for action, in the immediate defence of the city, as it is not likely that the enemy's force would have the temerity to commence an attack during the sickly season, between June and November, it cannot be necessary, nor will it be safe during that period, to station any considerable number of our troops near the city, or in the interior of the State. It is very desirable that safe summer positions should be found for the preservation from disease, of the disposable force, during the sickly season, at or near the principal posts on the sea coast, and at Plaquemine Bend; and indeed judging from the usual health of the company posted at Fort St. Philip, and of that which was for some time at Pettit Coquilles, whose health has usually been tolerably good, I find much reason to calculate on each of those positions becoming more healthy, by the immediately adjacent swamp being reclaimed, than any part of the interior of Louisiana. But until these improvements can be made, and permanent barracks constructed at one of those places, I am decidedly of the opinion that the Pass Christian should be alone relied on as a retreat from the diseases of summer and autumn—because it has been proven to be, beyond all doubt, the most healthy position in Louisiana. The only solid objection to this position is, that by land, such as is suitable for good roads, it is too distant from the city. But this objection must give way to the fact, that the intervening marsh, bordering on the Rigolettes heretofore deemed to be impracticable, will admit of a good road, which may be made by the troops at a very moderate expense. By this road, which would pass the Forts at the Rigolettes and Chef Menteur, I feel assured that an army would, at any season of the year, march from the Pass Christian to New Orleans, in 36 hours, the distance by crossing the Bay at the town of St. Louis, being estimated at 60 miles, viz:

To the town Bay of St. Louis,	-	-	-	6 miles,
Thence to the Fort at the Rigolette,	-	-	-	30 miles,
Thence to the Fort at Chef Menteur,	-	-	-	7 miles,
Thence to New Orleans, (by a good road)	-	-	-	17 miles,
				<hr/>
				60 miles.
				<hr/>

The troops at the Pass Christian would arrive in 12 hours march at the new Fort at the Rigolettes within the line of defence. By the aid of steam boats, the force at the Pass, would, at all times, except in very stormy weather, arrive at New Orleans in from 8 to 10 hours after their embarkation. In time of war, however, it might be deemed unsafe to rely on steam boats, or any unarmed craft being sent beyond the Rigolettes; and hence the necessity of a safe route by land, from the Pass to the Rigolettes at least, if not from thence to the city. There is indeed already a tolerably good wagon road, the greater part of the last mentioned distance. But if we can safely calculate on the received opinion, that no European force will venture to approach New Orleans, except during the healthy season, the distance ceases to form any serious objection to the Pass Christian, as a retreat from disease during the usual period of its existence at New Orleans; at the termination of which the troops would resume their positions within the line of defence. The corps of artillery must necessarily continue at all seasons at or near the fortifications to which they may be assigned, as well in that quarter as elsewhere.

I know of no argument by which I could possibly urge the necessity of this precautionary measure *to preserve the health of the troops*, that could be more forcible, than the simple fact, that in every description of our forces during the whole of the war, (excepting only Major General Brown's division in the year 1814, while on the Niagara, and at Fort Erie,) our actual loss by death, was every where greater from sickness, than from the shot of the enemy. And situated as New Orleans was during the late war, without capacious barracks and hospitals, the suffering of the sick and wounded, and their ultimate loss of life, for want of those comforts which no temporary means likely to be adopted, amidst the incessant labors of active military operations, would procure, would not fail to form a more faithful source of anxious *solicitude*, if not of *panic*, to the suffering army, than any evils which the field of battle would ordinarily present.

REPORT

OF AN

Inspection of the Right Wing of the Western Department, by Edmund P. Gaines, Major General, by Brevet, in the Army of the United States, for the half year, ending December 31st, 1827.

 FORT SNELLING.

October 2d, 1827.—The *position* selected for this work, is the best the country affords, as it regards the Indians; its convenience to the upper navigation of the Mississippi; its connexion with the river St. Peters; its health, fine scenery, rich land, excellent water, beautiful lakes and rivulets, with as good *water power* for mills, iron works, &c. as any in the United States. Surrounded with these advantages, Fort Snelling would be a very desirable position for a settlement, or for the location of troops, but for the extreme severity and long continuance of cold and frosty weather, and the scarcity of fuel: a great proportion of the surrounding country consisting of *prairie*, but thinly skirted with small patches of timber, mostly of a dwarfish kind. The country is generally hilly, but in many places considerably intersected with small lakes, ponds, and bogs. These last afford great quantities of *turf* or *peat*, similar, it is believed, to that which is obtained on the boggy lands of Ireland. It makes tolerable fuel. The fort stands upon the point of high land which terminates in an almost perpendicular cliff, on the right bank of the Mississippi river, within musket shot of the mouth of the St. Peters, which is below the fort and on the same side of the Mississippi; and near seven miles below the falls of St. Anthony. The fort is somewhat larger than it should be, were it designed never to have a garrison of less than a battalion. Its plan is defective. The main points of *defence against an enemy*, appear to have been in some respects sacrificed in the effort to secure the comfort and convenience of the troops in peace. These are important considerations, but at an exposed frontier post, the primary object must be *security against the attack of an enemy*. Health and comfort come next. The buildings are too large, too numerous, and extending over a space entirely too great: inclosing a uselessly large parade, five times greater than is at all desirable in that climate. The buildings are, however, for the most part, well constructed, of good stone, and other materials, and they combine every desirable convenience, comfort and security as barracks and store houses. The work may be rendered very strong, and adapted to a garrison of two hundred men, by removing one half the buildings; and with the materials of which they are constructed, building a tower sufficiently high to command the hill and undulating plain between the Mississippi and St. Peters: and by a block house on the extreme point or brow of the cliff, near the Commandant's quarters, to secure more effectually the banks of the river, the boats and the landing. Much credit is due to Colonel Snelling, his officers, and men, for the *immense labor and excellent workmanship exhibited in the construction of these barracks and store houses*. But this has been effected too much at the expense of the discipline of the regiment.

To obviate a future waste of labor by building upon erroneous plans, it is very proper to forbid the erection of any such permanent buildings, without previous instruction, as to the *plan* and the *materials* to be employed. In these views I am far from intending to intimate that any serious evil results from a *moderate* share of labor being performed by the troops at all times when not necessarily employed on drill, or on guard, or other duty under arms. On the contrary, I am convinced that officers and men, employed one third of their time in building fortifications and barracks, would be found to be more useful and efficient in war, than those upon whom no sort of labor is imposed: for the history of every active campaign in the United States will be found to be a history of *incessant labor*; and he who becomes familiarized to such labor in *peace*, will be so much the better qualified to sustain it in war—besides nothing tends so much to counteract the encroachments of vice in every class of men, but more particularly in the ranks of an army, as *habitual employment in healthful and useful occupations*; and if they are *laborious* occupations, experience authorizes me to say, that they are none the worse for being laborious. It is well for him who commands, to know, from actual experience, what men, confided to his care, are capable of doing; how far they should be required to persevere in their labors, and when they should be indulged with repose.

Fort Snelling is garrisoned by four companies of the 5th regiment of Infantry, under the command of Colonel Snelling.

Police.—Very respectable in quarters, in the neatness of the rooms, bedding and messing utensils; but somewhat defective in the arrangement of the ordnance stores.

Tactics.—As infantry and as light infantry, tolerable. The officers and non-commissioned officers appeared to be very well acquainted with their duties, in theory, but in the exercises there appeared to be something of that defect which proceeds from a want of habitual attention to the drill; something of the rust and awkwardness of men too much habituated to ordinary labor; nevertheless it is due to the officers and men of those companies, to say, that a few weeks of steady drill, would, I have no doubt, render them as perfect in their evolutions, as they are now in personal vigor; for their extraordinary *labor* in building the barracks and other works, though it has tended to detract from their appearance on duty under arms, and from the elegance and accuracy of their movements, yet they are left in possession of as great, if not a greater share of muscular and personal prowess, than less of labor, and more of the peace establishment duties of soldiers, would have produced. They have, however, as I have before intimated, labored much more than was necessary or proper.

Discipline.—In accordance with the foregoing views, which have been taken of the knowledge attained by these companies of their *police duties* and of *tactics*,

It may be proper here to add that a defect in the discipline of this regiment has appeared, in the character of certain personal controversies between the Colonel and several of his young officers; the particulars of which I forbear now to enter into, assured as I am that they will be developed in the proceedings of a general court martial ordered for the trial of Lieut. Hunter, and other officers at Jefferson Barracks. From a conversation with the Colonel, I can have no doubt that he has erred in the course pursued by him in reference to some of those controversies, inasmuch as he has intimated to

his officers his willingness to sanction in certain cases, and even to participate in *personal conflicts*, contrary to the 25th article of war.

He will of course be held responsible for any such irregularity which the pending trials may disclose.

In adverting to this subject, I take this occasion to say, that inasmuch as public opinion is supposed to have contributed to render the 25th article of war a *dead letter*, the interests and honor of the service require that this opinion should be fairly tested; and that if indeed the article in question is not to be enforced, I am convinced that it should be repealed; and under these circumstances I recommend its repeal. By its repeal, officers who feel bound to respect it as a part of the law which they are pledged to comply with, will be placed on an equal footing with those who shelter themselves behind it, by disregarding it, when they know that others will not disregard it. It is at present supposed to favor those most who permit themselves to regard no law, but that which accords with their own unbridled prejudices and passions; if it has this effect, it certainly should be repealed. A public officer cannot but be placed in a position of great peril and difficulty, when upon the one hand his reputation is assailed, and in public opinion jeopardized, by his submitting to a law, which public opinion may condemn; while on the other hand, so far from his being permitted to view the law in question as a *dead letter*, he is aware that he cannot violate it, without violating his oath, nor without subjecting himself to inevitable degradation. Besides, is it not a dangerous policy to suffer a public officer to take for granted that any article of war can with impunity be viewed as a dead letter? Is it not more in accordance with our boasted *government of laws*, that public functionaries should feel bound to obey whatever they find recorded in the statute book? A different policy, it is believed, would ultimately lead officers to consult their own convenience in the selection of articles of law to be obeyed or disregarded; and, in place of searching the statute book for their rule of conduct, they may merely keep an eye to public opinion; and cases may occur in which public opinion may *seem* to indicate the propriety of *other*, and *more important provisions of law being disregarded*. Believing as I do, that in time of peace, it is not possible for an officer to afford more unerring evidence of his fitness to fight the battles of his country, than by his *daring to do his duty according to law, even in defiance of popular prejudice*, I have no hesitation in repeating, that if the 25th article of war, is virtually a *dead letter*, then I request that it may be recommended to be repealed.

FORT CRAWFORD—PRAIRIE DU CHIEN

Commenced the inspection of this post, and its vicinity, on the 28th of September, and completed it on the 4th of October, 1827.

Fort Crawford, consisting of block-houses and huts, all of wood, is, as heretofore reported, so much decayed as to be uninhabitable without extensive repairs; and even with repairs, the barracks cannot be rendered sufficiently comfortable to secure the health of the troops. The floors and lower timbers are decayed, in part, by frequent overflowing of the river, which has left the wood soaked and filled with damp sediment. Orders have been given to Major Fowle, the commanding officer, to repair the barracks in the best manner the means under his control will permit. Ten thousand feet of plank was brought from Fort Snelling, and an additional

supply ordered to be furnished for the purpose, with the requisite tools; with these supplies, it is believed that the mechanics of Major Fowle's command will be able to render the troops tolerably comfortable until the next spring, when it is apprehended that the usual freshets in the river will again overflow the place. These freshets have often brought the high water into the barracks, to the depth of four feet, for several days in succession. This has sometimes occurred in the month of June and July. When this is the case, bilious diseases are sure to follow.

From a careful inquiry it is ascertained, beyond all doubt, that not only the present position of Fort Crawford, but every other part of the prairie, hitherto inhabited by white people or half breeds, has proven to be unhealthy in the latter part of summer, and during the months of September and October. I think it will be found, by referring to the monthly returns of this post, for several summers and autumns past, that the troops stationed here have been more unhealthy than at any other post in the same parallel of latitude, or north thereof. The number of sick, at the time of inspection, was one officer and *forty-four* enlisted men; although the aggregate force was but one hundred and seventy-seven officers and men. By which it will appear that more than one-fourth of the garrison was sick, besides several women and children.

The following report was received from Major Fowle, enclosing one from the Assistant Surgeon Coleman, which is likewise inserted:

“ FORT CRAWFORD, *October 3d, 1827.*

“ SIR: Agreeable to your directions I have required from Doctor Coleman, the Assistant Surgeon of this post, a statement of the prevalent diseases of this place, which report I have the honor to enclose for your information. Having been stationed at this garrison from June 1819, to May 1822, I can confirm what the Doctor states as respects the sickliness of the place. There has been generally many of the men sick in the months of May and June. The months of August, September, and October, have generally been particularly so during my residence at this place. But whether the health of the garrison would be improved by its removal to the opposite shore, I am not able to say; but am of opinion that it would be; and there is no place that will answer for a site for a post so well as Pike's Hill. You are able to decide on the propriety of the present garrison being removed.

“ I am, with respect, yours, &c.

[Signed]

“ JOHN FOWLE,

Br. Maj. 5th Inf'y, commanding.

To Maj. Gen. E. P. GAINES,

Commanding Western Department.”

“ FORT CRAWFORD, *October 2d, 1827.*

“ SIR: Agreeably to your request, I have the honor to report that this place is decidedly unhealthy, not only the garrison, but the villagers and Indians in the vicinities. Remittent, intermittent fevers, dysenteries, and diarrheas are the prevalent diseases; the causes of which can, I think, be abundantly found in the immediate vicinity.

“ I am not sufficiently well acquainted with the general character of the place, to authorize a decided opinion as to its healthiness; but am informed by the old inhabitants that it is usually unhealthy. I apprehend that any place

on this side the river, in this neighborhood, would be liable to all the causes of disease which this is; and would recommend a position on the opposite side of the river, as decidedly more healthy than this post.

"I am, &c.

[Signed]

"R. M. COLEMAN,
Assistant Surgeon.

"To Major FOWLE,
Commanding Fort Crawford."

These reports show, clearly, that if there existed no other objection to Prairie du Chien, its *unhealthiness* affords a decided objection to its occupancy as a permanent military post. But there is another objection which is almost as conclusive against this place, as that of its unhealthiness: It is, that there is no spot *on the prairie* which is not claimed by private individuals, except the few acres where the fort now stands. This circumstance cannot fail to subject the troops to the great evils of tippling shops being erected very near them.


To obviate all these evils, I have no hesitation in recommending the site upon *Pike's Hill*, on the right bank of the Mississippi, nearly opposite to the mouth of the Ouisconsin, about four miles from Fort Crawford, and in full view of the Fort and neighboring village.

The principal inconvenience that can attend the military occupancy of Pike's Hill is, that it does not afford *immediate* protection to the little village of Prairie du Chien; and its height being upwards of 400 feet above the river, will subject the troops to some expense of transportation beyond what would be incurred at Fort Crawford. This expense will, however, be counterbalanced by the manifest advantages of health, and a supply of timber for building and fuel, which the Hill and highlands adjoining it afford. A good wagon road may be made by ten men in the course of a week, from the landing, near a mile below the Hill, to the proposed site, on the summit of the Hill, without an ascent of more than about six or seven degrees.

The highland upon Pike's Hill, at the site recommended for a small fort, consists of about five acres of table land, as nearly level as could be desired. This is quite sufficient for the fort, and the requisite space for company and battalion exercise. The distance from this spot to the nearest point upon the river is about 300 yards: the intervening space, consequently, consists of a steep hill side, a part of which is a rocky precipice nearly perpendicular. In a deep hollow of this hill is a spring of excellent water, but little more than 150 yards from the proposed site. The proposed road is intended to avoid the steep part of the hill, and hence it will unite with the river at a good landing near a mile from the top of the hill. The road to the spring will be in part too steep for a carriage of any kind, but practicable on foot.

From the top of the hill (the site recommended) the land is sufficiently rich and nearly level for more than half a mile, at right angles from the river in the rear of the site. This body of land is well adapted to all the purposes of *cultivation*, as far as this should occupy the attention of the troops, viz: for gardening, grass lots, and pasturage.

Ground plan of a fort for 125 officers and men, recommended to be erected on Pike's Hill, near Prairie du Chein. To be constructed with a view to defence against small arms only.



A.—Stone Towers, 30 or 40 feet in diameter, two stories high.

B.—Barracks, two story high.

C.—A passage 12 feet wide.

D.—Officers quarters, two story high.

E.—Kitchens.

F.—Store-houses.

G.—Magazine.

H.—Stone wall and ditch.

NOTE.—The stone wall need not be more than 2 feet thick. The ditch 4 feet deep, and 8 feet wide, 2 six pounders, and two 5 inch howitzers, to be put into each tower.

The work to be constructed should consist of two small stone towers or castles, placed 120 feet apart, with the intermediate space filled up with a block of stone barracks. These to be enclosed by a wall with a ditch, terminating at each castle, and so constructed as to receive the support of a flank fire from each castle. This work should not be larger than to accommodate a garrison of five officers, with one hundred and twenty non-commissioned officers, artificers and privates; together with storage for their supplies. Upon this principle, I think it my duty to recommend the erection of all works that may in future be necessary upon our inland frontier. One hundred men well supplied with field pieces, and howitzers, and rifles, would defend a work of this description a whole year; or, if amply supplied with provisions and water for seven years, against one thousand of the best troops in the world destitute of artillery. It is believed that a stone or brick work of this description would not cost more than 50 per cent. beyond the expense of a wooden work for the same number of troops; and it would be ten times more durable, and much more secure than a wooden work could possibly be rendered.

The garrison of Fort Crawford consists of four companies of the 5th regiment of Infantry, commanded by Brevet Major Fowle.

Police, tactics, and discipline—Equal in every respect in quarters, and on duty under arms, to that part of the regiment now at Fort Snelling, notwithstanding the rough, dirty, and decaying barracks, without bunks, render it impossible to keep the clothing, bedding, arms, &c. in as good order, with equal, or even increased attention, as at Fort Snelling. The police duties quite as well understood, and as well attended to *in fact*, though not in *appearance*, as in any other part of the regiment. The tactics appear to be well understood, and quite as accurately attended to in battalion and company movements as Infantry, and as Light Infantry, as at Fort Snelling; a defect similar to that noticed at Fort Snelling on drill, was perceived among the troops at Fort Crawford; a defect apparently resulting from the troops having been less habituated to the drill, than to the use of the axe and spade, the trowel and hammer, the oar and setting pole.

The sick at Fort Crawford appeared to be well attended to, by Assistant Surgeon Coleman, of whose skill I have hitherto had opportunities of finding many proofs.

The rooms, however, occupied as a hospital, were indifferent and inconvenient in the extreme, most of the sick (consisting as I have before stated of more than one-fourth of the troops,) were principally afflicted with agues and fevers; and but few appeared to be dangerously ill.

The Indian prisoners confined at Fort Crawford appeared more miserable and despondent at the prospect of being kept in prison, than of being hanged. Their friends are reported to be extremely impatient at their confinement. Such of the Chiefs as assisted in procuring their surrender, have great reason to apprehend serious evils, should they be suffered to escape punishment; as they will be likely in this case to seek revenge for their confinement, among those who urged their surrender. They should be speedily tried and executed, or they should be liberated. The wound inflicted on their tribes by *confining them*, will not be healed, but will probably grow deeper and deeper, until they are tried and punished, or liberated.

FORT ARMSTRONG—ROCK ISLAND.

The garrison of this post consists of two companies of the 5th regiment of Infantry, commanded by Major Vose.

Commenced the inspection of this post on the 24th September, and completed it the 5th of October, 1827.

The position is a beautiful one, and uniformly more healthy than most other places on the river between Fort Snelling and St. Louis.

Police, tactics, and discipline—Quite equal, and in some respects, superior to the other companies of the regiment.

Medical department well attended to.

Subsistence good, and regularly supplied.

JEFFERSON BARRACKS.

Commenced my inspection at this post on the 10th September, and completed it on the 12th October, 1827.

The barracks are up, covered, and so nearly completed, that it is confidently believed that the whole of the corps of instruction may move into them by the commencement of winter, or at least before the middle of December next. These barracks are built of good stone, and exhibit satisfactory evidence of very substantial workmanship. For the details of this work, I refer to the report of that excellent officer, Quartermaster Clark, for September last.

FIRST REGIMENT OF INFANTRY.

Of this regiment there are six companies in tents near Jefferson Barracks, under the immediate command of Brevet Major Kearney.

Police, tactics, and discipline—unexceptionable and exemplary.

Each of the companies was found to be in all respects, equal to those inspected by me at Pensacola and New Orleans, in January and February last, as *Infantry*; and as *Light Infantry*, decidedly superior to any ever inspected by me. As Artillery, they have had but little instruction. But they are so completely disciplined as *Infantry* and *Light Infantry*, (and consequently well acquainted with the movements of rifle corps,) and the officers generally are so capable as practical instructors, and so well acquainted with the theory of every other *arm*, that I would vouch for their being rendered excellent practical artillerymen, dragoons, and riflemen, in the course of six months instruction; and this would be effected without deteriorating in the least, from the high character which I have given them, of the first rate infantry, and the best light infantry I have ever seen.

I know of no officer of the regiment who is not possessed of some peculiar fitness for his station—few or none below, and most of them much above mediocrity, and many of them are first rate officers, according to their opportunities and experience. The regiment is greatly indebted to the talents and steady vigilance of Major Twiggs and Major Kearney, for the present excellence of its character. The Colonel, McNeil, and Lieutenant Colonel, Taylor, meritorious as they are known to be, have not for some time past been much with the main body of the regiment. The Colonel being on furlough, and the Lieutenant Colonel in command, in Louisiana, where there

has been but few companies. They are, however, as perfectly instructed in their police, tactics, and discipline, *as infantry*, as any other part of the regiment.

Having pronounced the first regiment to be *unexceptionable* and *exemplary* in its *police, tactics, and discipline*, as *infantry* and as *light infantry*, it is deemed to be unnecessary to enter into details, under either of those heads. And I should report it to be in all respects prepared to be withdrawn from the *infantry corps of instruction*, but for the belief that its *example* will render it more useful here than at any other post, by the spirit of emulation which its present condition and character must excite among the other regiments; and that its continuance with the corps of instruction will enable it the sooner to acquire practical knowledge of artillery and dragoon duties, should horses, arms, and equipments be furnished; and I avail myself of this occasion to recommend that a supply of ordnance and ordnance stores, with fifty horses and the requisite equipments be furnished the corps of instruction for this purpose.

The medical department appeared to be supplied with every article necessary to the comfort and speedy restoration of the sick, who exhibited the most satisfactory evidence of attention and skilful treatment on the part of the medical officers. The sick of this and of each other corps at this post, were principally in the hospital, in charge of Surgeons Gale and Nicol, officers of long tried skill and fidelity.

The suttlers were supplied with all the articles necessary for the accommodation of the troops, at prices which were, for the most part, deemed to be moderate.

THIRD REGIMENT OF INFANTRY.

Of this regiment, there were six companies at this post. They appeared in battalion under the immediate command of Brevet Major Greene.

Police, tactics and discipline, respectable—not certainly equal to the first regiment, but in a state of improvement. The police, so far as it is discoverable in the important particulars of neatness and order in messing, and in whatever relates to the interior of very indifferent barracks or huts, it is very good; nor is it in any respect defective, to an extent which would warrant animadversion. The officers and men appear well instructed in their police duties generally. Their instruction in tactics is not quite sufficient; but it has arrived at that point of improvement, from which it is easy to perceive that a few weeks of steady drill will render these companies equal, or nearly equal to those of the first, in *infantry* tactics; as light infantry, they have not as yet had much practical instruction; nor have they much practical knowledge of artillery or dragoon exercise.

Of the officers of this regiment, most of them are highly qualified for the stations they occupy, many of them above mediocrity, and all but one, (possibly two) exemplary in their conduct and deportment. The only one known to be otherwise is in arrest, and will be brought before a general court martial in the course of a few days. Lieutenant Cowan is the officer alluded to. Lieutenant Harrison has been charged with some irregularities; but a belief that he has embraced a resolution of reform, and that the accusations against him appearing somewhat prejudicial and personal, they were not acted on.

SIXTH REGIMENT OF INFANTRY.

All the companies of this regiment were present at inspection, under the immediate command of Major Ketchum, in tents.

Police, tactics, and discipline—equal, or nearly equal, in most respects to the *third*—sufficiently instructed in most of the duties of interior police, without enjoying or exhibiting as many of the *advantages* of it as could be desired for want of good tents or barracks. As *infantry*, the *sixth* is very nearly equal, if not quite equal to the *third*; and as *light infantry*, it is better. Both these regiments, however, exhibit the remains of that *rust*, or want of critical exactness in tactics, which the best of corps will experience by being too long located in the bosom of the wilderness. A few weeks close instruction, however, will doubtless correct this evil. The present discipline of these corps is sufficiently respectable to render them nearly as serviceable, if not quite as serviceable, on an active campaign, and in battle, as the best of infantry in any service. The principle of every duty appears to be well understood; but in the execution of some of the evolutions, slight defect was perceived, resulting, manifestly, from a want of that *exact* and *habitual attention to the drill*, without which perfection is not attainable.

The officers of this regiment are, for the most part, highly qualified, and exemplary in their conduct and deportment. There is much reason to believe, that a few months instruction will render the officers and men of the *third* and *sixth* regiments, in most respects, equal to those of the *first*.

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT.

It is due to the Surgeons and Assistant Surgeons now in service, without exception, to say, that wherever my inspections have called me, their duties have been discharged with a degree of untiring zeal, persevering assiduity, ability, and fidelity, unsurpassed by any officers in this, or any other branch of the public service ever known to me. It has been my duty, in the course of every inspection during the last five years, to speak of most of these officers in terms of high approbation, because I could not, without injustice, speak of them otherwise. Aware that *indiscriminate* approbation is generally valueless, I should apprehend that my reports in favor of the medical department would be viewed in this light, were I not apprized of the fact, that most of the principal officers of the army, and many of the most intelligent citizens, who occasionally visit our hospitals, concur with me in opinion. I think myself within the limits of a *reasonable estimate*, when I state, that the increased vigilance and improvements gradually introduced into the medical department, during the last twenty-five years, principally since the war, and to a great extent since the year 1821, have produced in the ranks of the army, a saving of life and health, that may be fairly estimated at from 20 to 25 per cent., without any proportionate increase of expense, taking into view the number of troops, and of military posts within the United States at different periods of the time.

The value of such a medical staff to an army, on the approach of war, and consequently in peace while preparing for war, can be conceived only by those who have carefully watched the progress of contagious and other diseases in camps, or at unhealthy places occupied by large bodies of men, unattended by experienced Surgeons. Nothing tends so much altogether to

prostrate the strength and spirit of an army, as the prevalence of such a disease, without the talents necessary to check its ravages; and, on the other hand, nothing tends so much to establish the physical and moral energy of an army, as a high state of health, added to that perfect habitual *discipline*, which is attainable only by men in the enjoyment of health.

These views and reflections have suggested to me the propriety of inquiring whether the officers of this indispensable branch of the staff, so distinguished for their usefulness and science, are adequately provided for, and justly compensated for the valuable services they render. The result of this inquiry is, that there is scarcely any description of public officers, civil or military, who have been more inadequately paid, than the officers of the medical staff. Their education is necessarily a more expensive one, than that of most other officers; an expense, too, which is incurred by themselves or their friends, and in no case sustained by the public, as in the case of most other officers of the army. Their prospects of promotion are limited in the extreme; their responsibilities are always great, often greater than those of many other branches of the general staff; and their pay should be equal to that of any other.

I take this occasion to recommend a slight change in the organization and pay of the Medical Department, viz:

1st. The Surgeon General to have the pay and emoluments of a Brigadier General.

2d. Surgeons who have served fifteen years, to be denominated Senior Surgeons, to have the pay, &c. of Colonels of Cavalry.

3d. All other Surgeons to be denominated Junior Surgeons, and to have the pay, &c. of Lieutenant Colonels of Cavalry.

4th. All Assistant Surgeons who shall have served ten years, to be denominated Senior Assistant Surgeons, to have the pay, &c. of Majors of Cavalry.

5th. All other Assistant Surgeons to have the pay, &c. of Captains of Cavalry.

I have, hitherto, (in my report of December, 1826,) suggested the propriety of the Head of the Subsistence, Ordnance, and Pay Departments, each having the rank, pay, and emoluments of Brigadier General.

The subsistence at every post was found to be of good quality, without any exception worthy of notice. The subsistence officers discharged their duty correctly.

The sutlers at each of the posts referred to in the foregoing remarks, appeared to be supplied with ample assortments of goods suitable to the stations they occupy; and, for the most part, at prices which were reasonable.

NOTE.—The following remarks in reference to Baton Rouge Arsenal, were, it is believed, accidentally omitted to be sent with my report for the first half of the year 1827. It was but recently that I discovered the supposed error. In looking over my notes of my last winter and spring's inspection, I found among them a copy which, I think, is the one prepared to be sent to the General in Chief. Hence it is inserted in this report.

BATON ROUGE.

March 4th, 1827.—Inspected Baton Rouge Arsenal under the command of Lieutenant Isaac A. Adams, of the 4th regiment of Artillery.

Police—Excellent; ordnance and ordnance stores correctly inventoried, and arranged in very good order for preservation, for use, for issue, and for inspection.

The Powder Magazine.—The powder in good casks piled upon frames, so that no cask appeared to be subject to any such pressure as to endanger it or the magazine. In this particular, and in its neatness and methodical arrangement throughout, it is, I think, in better order than any that I have ever inspected. I am, however, decidedly of the opinion, that as no powder magazine can be considered as at all times secure from accidents, that may, with the greatest possible care, result from the receipt and the issue of powder, and from the occasional removal and ventilation necessary in this climate to preserve its strength and quality—to say nothing of the danger of lightning—a rampart or large traverse should be thrown up around this and every other magazine placed, as this is, in the immediate vicinity of other valuable buildings; for it is pretty evident, that an explosion of this magazine, containing as does, near 2000 lbs. of powder, would destroy the principal arsenal, together with the barracks, the value of which may be estimated at \$140,000. The enclosure which I propose, would not cost more than \$3,000, which would, in the event of an explosion, preserve those buildings, except the window-glass, with, perhaps, a part of the roofs nearest the magazine. Thus, a premium of but little more than $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent upon; the value of this property, would secure it against the risk of an explosion of the magazine; and when to this is added, the probable security of the lives of valuable officers and men, such as are usually at this post, I cannot but hope that this plan, which I have some years past proposed, of securing our magazines by traverses around them, may be adopted. If, however, I am supposed to be in error as to the actual effect of such traverses, walls, or embankments, then let an experiment be made, that my theory may be tested. I contend that the *potential* and destructive elements of an explosion of powder, proceed directly from the point at which the powder is deposited, in *right lines* through the open space, or the enclosure of least resistance from that point of explosion; and, consequently, that if the point of explosion is surrounded by a large traverse, the destructive force will direct itself *against*, and through the open space *above* the traverse. *The concussion* which such an explosion would produce upon the surrounding atmosphere, would doubtless be considerable; sufficient, perhaps, to overthrow or unroof a feeble building, and break window-sashes out of the direct lines of explosion; but not to destroy, or materially to injure, when covered by a traverse, substantial brick buildings, such as the barracks of Baton Rouge are.

ORDNANCE YARD.

The Ordnance Yard is well enclosed, levelled, and bordered with sod. The yard contains near fifty light pieces of iron and brass cannon dismounted, with brass howitzers, all handsomely arranged on skids, with the muzzles and vents stopped and sealed, agreeably to orders. The ordnance yard likewise contains near 30,000 round shot, with some shells. These, with iron cannon, were well lackered.

The Artillery Shed contains five good travelling gun carriages, with iron 18 pounders, spare limbers and equipments, with fixed ammunition and other stores, all well arranged.

The Arsenal, a large three story brick building, badly built—the lower side, next to the river, has settled into an imperfect foundation, so as to have given the upper part of the wall of the building, a tendency towards the river, of several inches. This building, though partially secured by strong

timbers, put in since the work was finished, is unsafe, and cannot be trusted with more than one-fifth part of the stores it should otherwise contain. The stores in this building, are very correctly and handsomely arranged and classed.

The Armourer's Shops.—These are not as large as are desirable in this climate, but the tools are conveniently arranged, and generally in fine order. The materials, and every thing about these shops, exhibit care, industry, and method.

Teams, Carriages, and Stables—in good order.

To conclude: The arsenal at Baton Rouge, with every thing belonging to it, is strikingly marked with the impress of *activity, method, and talents*, of a highly respectable order, on the part of the commanding officer, who is surpassed by few young officers of the army, known to me, for the variety and usefulness of his attainments, united with a degree of practical efficiency, equalled by very few, particularly for ordnance and artillery duties; and I think it due to his talents and worth, to say, that if I were required to select officers for the different departments of an army, destined for an active campaign, I know of but few company officers in the army, who I would prefer to Lieutenant Adams, to take charge of the ordnance department of such an army, during the campaign; and they would be preferred only in consequence of their having had a wider range of experience than has yet been in his power to enjoy; for, I repeat, that I have found no Arsenal better attended to, and but few equal to this.

INDIAN DEPARTMENT.

A desire to confine myself to my own proper sphere of service, and to abstain from entering into that of others, but partially connected with, and apparently designed by law to be independent of military authority, has hitherto induced me to limit myself, in respect to the Indian Department, principally to such local or special views and circumstances as appeared to be embraced in the letter of the law, and of the instructions which I have received, from time to time, from the Department of War. But, inasmuch as the most important duties that ever occur in our Indian relations, necessarily devolve, either directly or indirectly, upon the army; and, inasmuch as many of the most lamentable of our collisions with the Indians, are believed to have been owing to a defective system of intercourse with them, I avail myself of the present occasion, to remark more freely upon this subject than I have heretofore done; assured, as I am, that my remarks will pass for no more than they are worth, I content myself with the hope that they may be duly weighed, and considered as the deliberate and impartial result of long observation, careful inquiry, and intense reflection.

Viewing the present system as radically defective throughout, I propose to state, concisely, what I understand to be the primary objects of any system of intercourse with our Indian neighbors; and then proceed to sketch out the principal features of an improved system.

1. Acknowledged principles of natural law, make it the duty of civilized individuals, possessed of ample means, to afford immediate shelter, food, and clothing, to the helpless infant found at their door, destitute of parent, guardian, or other protector. The same law makes it the duty of civilized communities to lend a helping hand to any such uninstructed or uncivilized tribes of the human family, as happen to be found suffering near them. The

obligation to discharge this duty, with cheerfulness and good faith, cannot but be enhanced by the circumstance of the country, in whose bosom such suffering tribes are found, is, and was from time immemorial, *their own country*.

2. The faithful discharge of this duty by the United States, will not only tend to elevate their character for *justice* and *humanity*, but will, in all human probability, eventuate in providing for the national defence, an auxiliary force, worth more, during a period of war, than double the amount of money and labor that will be found requisite to carry into complete effect the long desired, but hitherto imperfect system of civilization.

3. An efficient system of civilization will tend to ensure to the United States the future friendliness, if not the lasting gratitude of the Indians. Without such a system, we cannot reasonably calculate on avoiding the hitherto afflictive evils of often having our helpless and unoffending frontier citizens, of both sexes and all ages, killed and scalped; and, in a future war, of finding thousands of the most vigorous native born sons of the American forest, arrayed in the ranks of our enemy against us.

4. The Indians already possess striking traits of several of the cardinal virtues; truth, unobtrusive kindness, and good will towards their friends and one another in peace; bravery and vigilance in war; promptitude and alacrity in encountering the most difficult enterprises, and laborious marches, amidst the most trying privations of food, of clothing, and of rest. In many of these characteristic traits, our neighbouring Indians are equalled by few, and surpassed by none of the human family of whose history I have any knowledge. It will be well for us to improve these valuable traits of the native American character.

5. Experience proves the fruitlessness of any known system of civilization, but that which is based on *literary and moral instruction*: and that no means of instruction can be relied on but that which commences with *children*; and which combines a *knowledge of letters*, and *agricultural and mechanic arts*, with *early habits of industry*. These will ensure to the students a *certain supply of food and raiment*, without which literature and science would perish; or at best tend but to render the horrors of want, more visible and frightful to the child of nature, whilst groping his way from barbarism to civilization.

Under these impressions, I hold it to be the duty of every citizen of the United States to raise his voice, however feeble, in favor of the instruction and actual civilization of these Indians; and against their being driven from their *homes*—which, for the most part, possess the charm of being the places of their birth: a charm not less dear to them, than to their civilized neighbors. If we put them afloat, and push them into the wide expanse of western prairie, we thereby assume the responsibility of feeding and protecting them, or of contributing perhaps to their annihilation, by subjecting them to the tomahawks of each other, and to famine, or of finding those who escape these evils, more than ever confirmed in their attachment to savage warfare and savage habits of life. Their present homes or villages, miserable as they are, are the places where the elements of civilization will, with the greatest certainty, and at the least possible expense be imparted to them.

In the expression of these opinions, I am certainly no more disposed to treat with disrespect the opinions of those numerous and distinguished statesmen and patriots who have entertained different views, than Robert Fulton was to condemn the numerous philosophers, who had for centuries failed to discover the now apparently simple, but pre-eminently valuable fact, that

steam can be advantageously applied to ships, as the most efficient propelling power known to man. Without laying claim to a hundredth part of the merit to which that distinguished citizen was entitled, I may venture to say, that Fulton was never better satisfied of the value of steam to the commerce of America, than I am of the practicability of effectually civilizing the American Indians, upon the plan which I have here to propose: a plan which I by no means lay claim to, as exclusively my own; the able, disinterested, and indefatigable missionaries, with their teachers, are entitled to the principal credit of the discovery.

I have witnessed the operation of the *principle* upon which it depends, only indeed upon a small scale, but to a sufficient extent to have seen its utility demonstrated.

I have seen among the Cherokees, Chickasaws, and Choctaws, boys and girls who learned to read and write, and occasionally to perform many of the laborious and useful occupations incident to civilized life, with a degree of cheerfulness, and a facility of attainment, unsurpassed by the children of their white neighbors; and I have known several of these persons since they have arrived at the years of maturity, who are industrious, amiable, and exemplary in their deportment, and who appear to be as much devoted to our institutions as any good citizens of any color need be. Those who have succeeded best, are principally those who were instructed in their own villages. There the process of instruction has a powerful influence, decidedly favorable to the cause of civilization upon all who reside at and in the vicinity of the places of instruction; there the occasional, daily labor of the children contributes to the aid and comfort of their parents, who, if opposed to books, as many of them are, will not fail to learn something of agriculture and other useful occupations; and there the Indians have generally begun to profit by practical conceptions of *individual right of property*. Every family is in the possession of some little property, such as a house or tent to live in, a horse, a cow, or at least some hogs and poultry; many of them possess cleared land in sufficient quantities to afford them a supply of bread; whereas if they break up and go to the west, they will be driven by necessity to part with most of these conveniences, and fall into their ancient habits of holding what property they happen to have as a common stock, subject to the *use and waste of all*.

One of the reasons which appears to be relied on for removing the Indians to the westward, is, that the great evil of their access to spirituous liquors, will be more likely to visit them in their present towns and villages, than it would be at the place of their destination in the west. A moment's reflection, however, combined with a knowledge of the enterprising character of our merchants and traders, will convince every man of reflection, that wherever the Indians go, traders are sure to follow them; and that, so long as the Indians have a dollar, or a skin, or a blanket, they who love *whiskey* will buy and drink it; and that every measure on our part to restrain them in the use of it, tends but to increase their fondness for it; their sacrifices to obtain it; and, consequently, to favor the pecuniary interests of those, who in defiance of every legal restraint, persevere in supplying them. Thus it is, that our restrictive laws, prohibiting the supply of spirituous liquors to Indians, tend to favor those only who are regardless of all law, and seriously to injure, not only the Indians generally, but the honest traders who take the law for their guide. Hence, I am decidedly of the opinion, that no such restriction should exist. The laws should allow every

licensed trader to sell spirituous liquors, and every other commodity which the Indians themselves, in council, may authorize, *to all who shall have money or skins to pay for it, but to no other person.* This measure would, I am convinced, tend sooner to restrain the intemperate habits of the Indians than any prohibitory laws that we could possibly enforce. An efficient system of instruction will very soon place the moral and municipal power of the Indians in the hands of educated men of their own tribes. In the mean time no such evils are to be apprehended from the proposed free trade, as those which now exist. Now, it is well known, that the lawless traders will sell whiskey at enormous prices for whatever the Indian has to give them—his blanket, his gun, the kettle, with the corn and meat on which his wife and children depend for their subsistence: their all is often given for a few kegs of poisonous whiskey, without regard to price; and it cannot be doubted, that the fact of its being *smuggled* into their country, *secretly sold*, and *secretly* purchased, adds much to the high estimation in which they hold it, and to the keenness of their desire to indulge in the use of it. They (or at least many of them,) call it the “*milk of their white friends*,” and they know it to be the only article of trade which their “*great fathers at Washington*,” have forbidden them to touch; and we all know that “*forbidden fruit*,” when secretly recommended by a *serpent*, holds forth to man, in a state of nature, irresistible attractions.

The adult Indians are, perhaps, for the most part, irreclaimable, or at best not likely to receive sufficient instruction to render their civilization complete. But their condition will be greatly improved by the instruction and usefulness of their children. Nor do I consider it by any means so likely that the children of habitual drunkards should, in this respect, follow the evil examples of their parents, as that they should, while favored with the lights of instruction, weep over, and endeavor to restrain the vices of such parents, and for ever after carefully guard themselves against such vices. Who among us, I would ask, has not witnessed such results among the mortified and distressed children of many of our own white drunkards?

If ancient or modern history may be credited—if, in short, the events of our own country, with those of other nations known to us during the last fifty years, may be relied on as evidence of what may again occur, they prove clearly, that inasmuch as most of those nations owe their very existence, and whatever independence they possess, next to the intervention of a kind Providence, to a vigorous development of the moral and physical prowess of all such of their citizens or subjects, as were deemed to be able and willing to fight their battles, we cannot doubt but that we may have occasion for the services of Indians, as well as white men; and we should therefore lend some aid in giving instruction, military as well as civil instruction, to all such as may be disposed to receive it.

The more we advance in these efforts, the more safe and durable will be our republic, and the better shall we be prepared for the great trial of war, let it come when it may; a trial which has annihilated many *apparently* powerful nations, shaken others to their centre, and often left the best of them, even the victors, crippled, deeply in debt, and in mourning for sacked cities, fallen patriots, and suffering widows and orphans. This has been in part our lot: and we should never forget that many of the most distressing evils of the war of 1812, 13, and 14, evidently proceeded principally from a want of preparation, and from the number of Indians opposed to us. The only possible means of avoiding a recurrence of some of the worst of those evils, is to instruct, civilize, and thus secure to ourselves the friendliness and future services of these numerous tribes.

The virtuous and the wise of every State, and of every country, cannot but yield to the conclusion that it is *necessary*, and *just*, and *right*, that we should avail ourselves of every *hand* and every *heart* capable of being advantageously turned to the national defence. Our wars should, if possible, be for ever limited to the purposes of self-defence; but for these purposes, a slight glance at the character and overwhelming military and naval resources of several of the European powers likely to be our enemies, must convince us that our preparations, to be complete, should extend to every class of Americans capable of vigorous service. Such a state of preparation for war, will ensure to us a continuance of peace; or if under such circumstances war should be forced upon us, we shall then be prepared to fix its greatest evils upon the aggressor.

Under this view of the subject, believing that no nation can furnish better light troops than most of these Indians, with the aid of instruction; and believing, that in every war of long continuance near them, they will be found in the ranks of our adversary, if not previously secured to us by the lights of instruction, I cannot but believe that our efforts to instruct and civilize them will be more than remunerated by the service they will render us in the course of any future war, in which the powers of Europe may involve us.

I am aware, that it has been apprehended by those who have not closely investigated the subject, that our instruction, and particularly our *military instruction*, bestowed on the Indian children, may possibly tend to create among them a formidable enemy to us. This apprehension, I am convinced, is destitute of any reasonable foundation. I contend that their advancement in knowledge will, at every step, attach them more and more to us, and to our institutions, and will make them feel that the United States is *their* country as it is *our* country. Every light which literature and science can impart, must tend to convince them, as it has convinced the numerous Europeans settled among us, and as it has convinced the people of Mexico and South America, that their best interests prompt them to espouse our institutions, and to shun, as their deadliest enemy, every sort of political connexion with any of the powers of Europe. Let us civilize and instruct the youth of these tribes, and they will become faithful and valuable citizens of the United States. In support of these views, I take pleasure in stating a well ascertained fact, that during the war, in 1813 and 14, there was no instance known to me of an Indian, or part Indian, that had received instruction and uniform kind treatment from the citizens of the United States, who ever joined our enemy. Such Indians, though but very partially instructed, have proved themselves to be our steadfast friends, and have in many cases entered our service as volunteers, and heartily united with us in meeting and beating our common enemy. The rolls in the public offices at Washington will exhibit the names of many, I may say hundreds, of Indians of this description. Many of them were personally known to me; and, I am sure there are several members of Congress from New York, Ohio, Tennessee, Mississippi, Georgia, and Alabama, who will concur with me in the opinion, that many of those Indians manifested as much zeal and devotion to our service, as most of our own citizens of similar limited education usually manifested. They did not perhaps do us as much good, because we forbid their fighting in the manner best known to them—viz. *as savages* are in the habit of fighting.

No statesman who will investigate the subject, and recall to mind the untoward disasters which marked the character of the late war with England, can doubt that the most destructive and distressing of those disasters proceeded from our red enemies. Should a doubt exist upon this subject, a glance at the details of the war at Detroit, river Raisin, Miama in the north-west, and fort Mimms, in the south, cannot but remove such doubt. It may have been excusable, if not sound policy, during the continuance of the war, to charge the evils of those disasters exclusively to England; or in, part, to the inefficiency of one of our unfortunate commanders. But since peace is restored, let us do justice to all concerned, but especially to ourselves. Let us admit that the premature invasion of Upper Canada furnished to England an excuse, if not a justification, for the alliance she formed with her old friends and our enemies, the north-western Indians. Let us admit that our unfortunate General Hull, found, not until it was too late to profit by the discovery, that he was not only unprepared to sustain himself in the enemy's country, but even to remain at Detroit, or return to Ohio, without subjecting to Indian massacre, the inhabitants of Michigan Territory, with a considerable portion of his inexperienced and undisciplined army. When we have admitted this much, reluctantly as we may admit it, then, and not until then, shall we be prepared to admit the full measure of destructive power which the north-western nations of Indians sent into the field against us. They knew but little of us; many of them, it is believed, had but seldom heard of us, or thought of us, but as their enemies. Under these circumstances, their alliance may have been voluntary: at any rate, there is no evidence of their having been *coerced* into that alliance by England. They fought as savages are accustomed to fight. For this England is accountable.

I have no means of ascertaining, with tolerable certainty, our actual losses of men and money, which resulted from the great number of Indians that took the field against us. But I am under the impression that much the greater part of our losses in the north-west, as well as in the south-west, previous to the invasion of New Orleans, in December, 1814, may justly be attributed to the enterprise and *vexatious prowess* of the Indian forces opposed to us.

It is, I believe, admitted by our own and British officers, who have had the best means of judging, that there never was, at any one time, a regular British force on land, of more than one thousand men, opposed to any part of the north-western army; and that the number of Indians opposed to us, in that quarter, often exceeded 4000 warriors. If this estimate be correct, then it may be reasonably inferred that the Indians, (whose enterprise and prowess were at least equal to those of their white allies,) must have occasioned four-fifths of the disasters which we incurred on land in the north-west, prior to and during the command of General Harrison. In the south and west the whole of our losses, up to the latter end of the year 1814, were produced by our red enemy, excepting only a few men who fell at Mobile Point and Pensacola.

If I am nearly right in the foregoing estimates, I am unquestionably correct in the conclusion at which I aim, that the *Indians*, opposed to us in 1812, '13, and '14, were found to possess sufficient enterprise and prowess to thin our ranks, *destroy our frontier inhabitants, and force us to drain our Treasury to an amount of nearly one fourth of the whole of our losses*

on land during the war, notwithstanding their actual numbers are believed not to have amounted to more than *one-tenth of the land forces employed by England against us.*

I am warranted by the opinions of some of the most respectable officers and citizens of the United States, those who have had experience in conducting military operations against Indians, as well as against the most distinguished British regulars, in saying, that in the forests, such as are every where to be found upon our inland frontier, an Indian force of from 1000 to 4000 warriors is, in fact, a more formidable enemy than an equal number of British regulars. I would cheerfully submit this question to the decision of Generals Jackson and Harrison, whose conflicts with the Indians have been more frequent and considerable than those of any other officers or citizens of the United States, and who have each met and beaten British regulars—whether they would not, at any time, have deemed it a favorable circumstance, to have found a British force, of equal numbers, in place of any Indian force that ever assailed them.

However much we may be opposed to accept the aid of Indians without civilization, in defending our country against European invaders; yet, when the alternative presents itself, of having them *with us*, or *opposed to us*, we could not, in that case, hesitate to avail ourselves of their aid: but when we shall have civilized them, there can then be no possible objection to our accepting their services, and considering them as a respectable part of the national forces.

Among the few correct laws which our neighboring Indians possess, and which have, for more than twenty centuries past, received the approbation of the greater part of the civilized world, there is one which our undue forbearance may induce them to neglect: It is, that "*life shall be taken for life*"—or, in other words, that he who kills a human being, (except in a state of open war, or in obedience to law, or in self-defence,) shall lose his own life.

There is not to be found in any code of law, a single provision more essential to the welfare and civilization of our neighboring Indians; and they should be encouraged in the strict observance of this law; and we should enforce it among them whenever they take the life of a citizen of the United States. Nothing can tend so much to the security of our frontier inhabitants, (short of the annihilation of the Indians,) as the rigid enforcement of this law, until the proposed system of civilization shall have had the desired effect.

I have now to submit the outline which I propose as a substitute for the present Indian Department, viz:

1. One General Superintendent, to be stationed near the War Office: to discharge such duties, relating to Indian affairs, as may be confided to him by the Secretary of War; for example, to conduct the fiscal concerns of the Indian Department; to distribute to superintendents and teachers all laws, regulations, and orders, connected with Indian affairs; to receive, record, and consolidate, or make abstracts of, all returns and reports from superintendents and teachers, to be laid before the Department of War, the President, or Congress.

2. Six Superintendents, viz: One to be stationed on the eastern border of the Chickasaw nation, for the southern Indians, east of the Mississippi river; one to be stationed at Fort Towson, for the Indians of the country bordering on Red river; one to be stationed at Fort Gibson, for the Indians of

the country bordering on Arkansas and White rivers; one to be stationed at Fort Leavenworth, for the Indians of the Missouri river, and its dependant streams; one to be stationed at Fort Crawford, for the Indians of the Upper Mississippi river, and the adjacent country; and one to be stationed at Green Bay, for the Indians of the upper lakes, and their dependant streams, on our side of the national boundary.

These Superintendents should be charged with all duties of a national or military character, whether between the United States and Indian nations, embraced in their districts, respectively, or between the different nations or tribes within or adjacent to such districts; and generally to discharge such other duties as may be confided to them by the Department of War.

For example: To keep the peace between the Indians and our frontier inhabitants, and between the Indians of different tribes; to take seasonable measures to inquire into, and settle all controversies or disturbances, calculated to lead to hostilities; to protect, and urge the Indians to protect and encourage the public teachers; to make annual visits of inspection to every tribe, principal town, and school within their districts; to report to the head of the Department the result of such inspections; and to assist at all Indian treaties in their respective districts.

These Superintendents should have the military rank, pay, and emoluments of Majors of Cavalry, and should each have placed under his immediate command a company of Mounted Riflemen, to consist of a Captain, four Subalterns, five Sergeants, four Corporals, four Artificers, with one hundred private soldiers. The principal part of the company of each district should generally accompany the Superintendent on his tours of inspection, and in attending treaties; and in case of hostilities being committed, or apprehended, on any part of the frontiers, the Superintendents, with each of the companies near the supposed theatre of hostilities, (excepting a small guard to be left in charge of their posts,) should be required to march promptly to the spot, and settle the disturbance; and, if necessary, try and punish the offenders.

3. One principal teacher for each nation, with an assistant teacher for every hundred families of each nation. To these should be confined the all important detailed duties of *all kinds of instruction necessary for the purposes of civilization*; and to render such aid as the Indians may need or accept, in their local, civil, and municipal concerns. To settle all such civil and criminal controversies, not amounting to capital offences, as may occur within the limits assigned them, and which may be referred to them by the chiefs, or council of the nation, or by the parties concerned, either among the Indians or traders, and such as may occur between Indians and traders: with power to regulate the sale of spirituous liquors, and so far to regulate the Indian trade generally, under the control of the Superintendent of the District, as to protect the Indians from imposition by exorbitant prices or by sales on credit of spirituous liquors, or other articles not actually *necessaries of life*; to prohibit all traders from purchasing of the Indians their blankets, agricultural or mechanical tools, and such other articles as are absolutely necessary to the health and comfort of their families.

A candid inquiry, I am convinced, will result in proving that the Indians have, in the last ten years, derived ten times more advantage towards their civilization, from the schools established among them by missionaries, and principally at the expense of private individuals, than from all the agencies, and other means employed by the United States, since the establishment of our government.

The expense of the agencies, it is believed, has exceeded that which the proposed system will require, annually, for twenty years. After which the whole expense of the proposed system will, it is believed, cease: for, in twenty years time, so great a proportion of the youth of each nation will have received the benefits of instruction, that they will, by that time, be prepared to accomplish their own civilization; and to discharge the ordinary duties of citizens of the States and Territories within whose limits they may happen to be placed.

Upon the subject of conferring upon the Superintendents of the Indian Department, *military authority*, and placing under each of them a company of Mounted Riflemen, I have to add, that this feature of the proposed system is essential to give effect to any system that can possibly ensure success.

I have been told by some of the most experienced officers of the Indian Department, that the presence of military force was essential to the prompt adjustment of controversies with them; that little or nothing beyond what the Indians felt an immediate interest in, could be effected without such aid; and I have myself witnessed repeated evidence of the existence of a disposition, on the part of the southern and western Indians, to yield with more apparent cheerfulness to the wishes of the United States, when those wishes were communicated in the presence of an efficient force, and by persons authorized to wield that force, than by any other men without such force or authority. It is not, however, to be inferred from this fact, that the presence of a military force necessarily operates upon the fears of the Indians. On the contrary, the peculiarity of the Indian character, to which I allude, may, with more reason, be attributed to a chivalric spirit, added to the defective views of the Indians on such subjects, and to their general want of information.

Most of the nations of Europe, in their emergence from barbarism to civilization, and for centuries since, have been in the habit of treating with more marked deference, the *request* of a neighboring nation or individual, possessing the present means of enforcing that request, than the humble *prayer* or *demand* of one not in the immediate possession of any such means. Even the most fashionable votaries of *modern* chivalry, are often found to be more *courteous* and more *just*, to an armed neighbor of inflexible temper, than to those who take *reason* and *justice*, without force, for their guide and their shield. Such chivalry, it must be confessed, has a tincture of cowardice in its composition. It is, nevertheless, that legitimate chivalry to which men of *honor* (in the chivalric sense of the word,) have for centuries past paid homage, throughout the most enlightened nations of the world. It is not, indeed, that chivalry which is based upon high moral courage, which prompts man to do right without fear, and without a hope of reward, other than that which must ultimately flow from habitual rectitude of conduct.

The Indians naturally confide most in those whom they deem to be least disposed to deceive them. They have been very often deceived by individuals going amongst them, falsely representing themselves to be in the confidence of the government, showing them papers, seals, &c. to confirm their statements. The Indians, being mostly unable to read, fail to detect the imposition. They are thus so often deceived, that they cannot place such implicit confidence in any one or two private individuals, as in those who are accompanied by military force. In this case, they see the *men*, the *arms*, and the *uniform*, such as they have seen only under the control of United States officers,

and such as have usually gone among them, not for the purposes of *trade* or *traffic*, not to bribe or cheat them, *but to discharge public duties according to law and orders*; and, in place of taking from them the little they have, of feeding the hungry, and often of clothing the naked. Hence their confidence in the United States troops, and those who accompany them; and hence the necessity of the superintendents or agents being clothed with military authority, and supplied with mounted men, which is the only description of force that can always be efficiently employed against hostile parties. Such indeed is the respect which the Indians entertain towards this description of force, that I have no doubt but a single company, stationed at either of the posts above designated, would contribute more to the security of the frontier inhabitants, than a battalion of the best infantry in our service, which I believe to be equal to any infantry in the world. Without the aid of horses, any of the western Indians can, with the greatest ease, keep out of the way of infantry; and they have more than once ventured in small parties to commit depredations within a few miles of considerable bodies of infantry, without the possibility of their being overtaken or punished. They can march with ease from forty to forty-five miles in a day, or twelve hours; our troops cannot march more than from thirty to thirty-five miles in the same space of time.

The foregoing views, I trust, will sustain me in a conclusion, to which I attach a degree of importance, second only in a military point of light, to the entire civilization of the Indians. It is, that the United States infantry stationed upon the west and north-western frontier, should be relieved by the proposed corps of mounted riflemen, and be posted at or in the vicinity of the most vital points of the maritime and northern frontier, at which the services of disciplined infantry will be most likely to be required on the approach of war with any of the European powers. These positions I will here enumerate, in the order of their relative importance in a state of war. 1st, New York; 2d, New Orleans; 3d, Philadelphia; 4th, Charleston, South Carolina; 5th, Plattsburg; 6th, Boston; 7th, Baltimore; 8th, Savannah; 9th, Norfolk; 10th, Mobile; 11th, Newport; 12th, Wilmington, North Carolina; 13th, Portland; 14th, New London; 15th, Eastport. For the defence of the city of New York and New Orleans, there should never be less even in time of peace, than a regiment of artillery, and two regiments of Infantry for each place; for Philadelphia, Charleston, South Carolina, Plattsburg and Boston, there should be a regiment of infantry, and a battalion of artillery at each place; and for each of the other positions, there should never be less than a company of artillery and a battalion of infantry. This measure is necessary now, because it will be necessary on the approach of war, and the change from peace to war may be sudden. The regular forces, limited as they are in number, should be located exclusively with a view to immediate preparation for repelling the first onset of a disciplined enemy, protecting such places as he would be likely to pounce upon at the commencement of the war, before we are supposed to be in readiness for a vigorous defence; and, what is of equal importance in the early part of a war, to receive the first onset, with a degree of skill and efficiency calculated to inspire confidence among our untried troops and citizens; and at the same time to secure the respect of our adversary, and compel him to approach us with due circumspection. The first conflicts that have usually occurred between our troops and a European enemy, have generally produced a panic in the ranks of the unsuccessful party; this never fails to increase the confidence and moral prowess of the victor. This interesting principle has, perhaps,

never been more demonstratively exemplified, than by the defence of New Orleans. There the brilliant attack of the night of the 23d December, on the part of General Jackson, with the whole of his force, evidently produced a panic in the ranks of General Packenham, which prepared him for defeat, and our troops for the most extraordinary victory ever achieved.

I could add many other reasons in favor of recalling our infantry regiments from the wilderness, and posting them at or in the vicinity of the most probable theatre of their future conflicts with an European enemy; but I deem it to be sufficient to say, that there is not one of the posts which I have enumerated, excepting New Orleans and Norfolk, that has a garrison within supporting distance, sufficient to resist the sudden attack of an enemy consisting of two battalions, with six frigates, or even six sloops of war. Nor could we, at this season of the year, avail ourselves of the second and fifth infantry in less than five or six months time. The maxim that "*every military measure during a period of peace, to be right, must be adapted to a state of war,*" is deemed to be strictly applicable to the subject of the foregoing remarks.

In reference to the *organization* of the companies of mounted riflemen, it may be proper to explain why a greater number of officers and men are proposed for those companies than has been usual in our service. It is because I deem this organization to be the most convenient and efficient for every corps in service, as well as for the militia; and it may be recollected, that in my report of December, 1826, I recommended a similar organization for every corps of the army and militia of the United States.

Four subalterns are necessary for each company, consisting of one hundred privates; and more particularly so, when such companies are to be placed at separate posts, where there must always be one or two staff officers, to consist of subalterns of the company. These staff officers may, with perfect convenience, attend to the fiscal concerns of the Indian Department in each district, and with the aid of the teachers, receive and distribute annuities, &c. &c.

I have been assured by many officers of very high respectability, who have had commands in the vicinity of Indian tribes, that if required to discharge every duty devolving on the Indian Department, with such tribes, their attention would not thereby be more frequently turned to Indian affairs, than it usually has been upon every occasion of disturbance or complaint among them, or between them and our citizens. Upon all such occasions the commandants are appealed to, and their intervention would doubtless be much more effective, by having the entire control of Indian affairs, which they would cheerfully attend to without any additional allowance beyond the extra expense that would attend this service. The fifth Sergeant is deemed necessary to do the duties of Company Clerk and Quartermaster Sergeant. The four Artificers are necessary to every company of every corps. All of which is respectfully submitted.

EDMUND P. GAINES,

Major General by Brevet Commanding.

To Major General JACOB BROWN,

General in Chief United States Army, Washington, D. C.

HEAD QUARTERS, WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
CINCINNATI, OHIO, *December 2d, 1826.*

General Remarks concerning the Militia of the United States.

That the Militia forms the basis of the *defensive* and *protecting power* of the Republic, the history of our independence, and of two successive and triumphant wars, with one of the strongest powers of Europe, affords the most irrefragable evidence. Our consequent unexampled growth and prosperity proves the inestimable value of this power, and the means of enhancing it. But it is not to be concealed, that this acknowledged bulwark of our liberty and national existence, has been suffered to remain for fifty years, in a great measure, without the order or uniform organization essential to its efficiency.

Such an organization, I cannot but consider to be one among the first important measures necessary to enable us "to form a more perfect union, establish justice, ensure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity." Every measure that can be devised in regard to the Militia, as well as to other branches of the national defence, to be perfect, or in the highest degree useful and efficient, must be based upon the supposition that war between the United States and some two or more of the strong powers of Europe, (for no one of them will be likely alone to trouble us,) is possibly not far distant. To act or to think correctly upon military subjects, it is proper that the mind's eye should be steadily fixed upon a state of actual war. Were it not for the strong probability, (which indeed approaches to absolute certainty,) that war will occur, sooner or later, every step towards perfecting ourselves in a system of national defence, would be felt as a heavy burden. A military system, designed only for a state of peace, would be as impolitic and as useless, as an expensive fleet of ships of the line placed on the top of a mountain. It would be necessary, in either case, on the approach of war, to undo whatever had been erroneously done, and then to commence anew the whole work. Were I called upon to suggest the necessary measures to put the militia and the nation in a posture of defence, preparatory to war, I should proceed upon the principles embraced in the following propositions, which the test of time and experience prove to be self-evident truths.

1. Preparation for war, while powerful neighboring nations stand ready for aggression, is an inherent right and a solemn duty, to which the governments of independent nations should promptly attend.

2. Preparation for war is necessary to prevent war, or if it must come, to lessen its attendant evils.

3. In peace is the proper time to prepare for war.

4. Every military principle, and every measure of preparation in peace, should be strictly applicable to a state of war.

5. Every measure of military preparation in peace, not strictly applicable to a state of war, should be held as radically wrong, useless, or mischievous.

6. "Good order and subordination, so useful in all places, are no where so essential as in an army. The government ought precisely to determine the functions, duties, and rights of all military men—soldiers, officers, chiefs of corps, generals."

Organization.—This, to be in the highest degree convenient and useful, should be the same in the militia throughout the United States, as in the regular army. But here it should be first simplified and rendered uniform, as to the rank of officers for each branch of the general staff, and the number and rank for each regiment.

The chief of each branch of the general staff of the army, should be a general officer; and to the bureau of each, there should be attached one principal assistant, for discharging duties relating exclusively to the militia, preparatory to their being called into the service of the United States.

For example: The principal Assistant Adjutant General for the militia, should correspond with the Adjutant Generals of States and Territories, receive from them and consolidate, annual and semi-annual returns of each corps of the militia of each State, distribute laws, regulations, and orders for their instruction, furnish details for service, and perform such other duties as the laws and the President of the United States may direct, in reference to the classification and instruction of the militia, preparatory to their entering the service of the United States.

The principal Assistant Inspector General, the principal Assistant Quartermaster General, the principal Assistant Commissary General of Subsistence, the principal Assistant Commissary General of Ordnance, the principal Assistant Paymaster General, and the principal Assistant Surgeon General for the Militia, would each find ample employment, and render very important services in their respective departments, even during a period of peace, by actively communicating with, and obtaining from the State authorities, from time to time, accurate reports and returns, embracing all subjects of deficiency, and of the means of supply in each department, tending to the full development of the military resources, whether *local* or *disposable*, of every section of each State. The information thus collected would, on the sudden approach of war, enable the War Department to comprehend at one view, *and in one hour*, the actual force and means of supply directly applicable to the defence of any and of every assailable and vital part of the national frontier, and the head of that Department, with such information, aided by the experienced General in Chief, would, I have no doubt, in one day, prepare a better plan of defence than could possibly be prepared in six months under existing circumstances; and with such information, added to a rational and practical organization and an efficient control of the militia, such as is guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States, an army of from *one to eighteen hundred thousand* freemen might be assembled in the respective States under arms, and in march to their several posts, within forty days after the date of our declaration of war, ready to meet and beat the invading foe; and when it is added, as it may be truly added, that the whole expense of the proposed improved organization of the general staff will not be more than many a merchant of our country pays, annually, to the clerks of one single mercantile establishment, I cannot but hope that this part of my proposition may be found to merit the approbation of the proper authorities.

In addition to the principal assistant, proposed to be added to each branch of the general staff, for the purpose of discharging duties relating exclusively to the militia, preparatory to a state of war, the laws should provide that on the approach of war there should be appointed an assistant of each branch of the general staff, for every division, and for every brigade called into the service of the United States. These staff officers to have fixed relative rank

and pay for each grade; those for a division to have the rank, pay, &c. of Lieut. Colonels; and those for a brigade, the rank, pay, &c. of Majors; the pay, &c. of each officer of any one grade being first made equal throughout the army. All officers of the general staff, above the rank of Captain, should be selected from the field officers and Captains of the line of the army, provided they shall have served from three to five years at the head of a company. But no officer should be placed at the head of either branch of the general staff, or appointed principal assistant to either, (the Medical Department excepted,) without having commanded a company for at least five years in the actual service of the United States. All other officers of each branch of the general staff, (other than those of the Pay and Medical Departments,) such as Assistant Quartermasters, Assistant Commissaries of Subsistence, and Assistant Commissaries of Ordnance, should be selected from the Lieutenants of the army, and allowed extra pay; but no staff rank above that of Captain.

A regiment, (whether of Cavalry, Artillery, Infantry, or Riflemen,) should consist of—

Field and Staff—One Colonel, one Lieutenant Colonel, two Majors, one Adjutant, one Quartermaster, one Sergeant Major, one Quartermaster Sergeant, one Chief Artificer, and one Chief Musician.

Ten Captains, twenty First Lieutenants, twenty Second Lieutenants, fifty Sergeants, forty Corporals, forty Artificers, twenty Musicians, and one thousand private soldiers.

A company should consequently consist of one Captain, two first and two second Lieutenants, five Sergeants, four Corporals, two Musicians, four Artificers, and one hundred private soldiers. The extra Sergeant to be Clerk and Quartermaster to the company.

Two such regiments, or twenty companies, (of any one or more arms) should constitute a brigade, two brigades a division, and two divisions an army corps.

That my proposition for each regiment of every arm, and of every description of force, to have an equal number of officers, artificers, and men, will excite the amazement of those who believe in the infallibility of British and French organization, I am well prepared to expect; nor do I presume to calculate on being sustained in this proposition, by any man who has, either directly or indirectly, contributed to the apparently whimsical changes to which a good part of our military system has been the victim.

But if any solid advantage does really attend the varied organization of other countries, or that of our own, I am constrained, by a sense of duty, and from twenty-six years of careful observation and experience, to say, that I have been unable to discover any such advantage: on the contrary, I have witnessed many inconveniences, and some serious injuries to the service, resulting from our past varied and irregular organization. I have known no army prepared to meet, or that have met and beaten any considerable body of British troops, but such an one as necessarily consisted of artillery, infantry, cavalry or dragoons, and riflemen, either regular, volunteer, or militia; and I doubt whether there is an officer of experience in the army or militia of the United States, who, if required to make an estimate of force for any great enterprise against the regular troops of any civilized power, would not embrace in his estimate parts of every arm or corps just now mentioned. Occasions may often occur, in the course of an active campaign, where artillery and dragoons would be required to serve as infantry, and where infantry

and riflemen should be mounted or employed as artillerists. All should therefore occasionally study and practise the use of each arm, and the movements of each corps. If it were otherwise, detachments composed of different arms (which so frequently and so necessarily occur in the neighborhood of an enemy,) would often be inefficient or useless, for want of a commander acquainted with the duties of each corps. It has been said by certain theorists, that the riflemen need only to understand the use of his rifle, and the *use of his legs*; that he has no need of a knowledge of infantry tactics, or of the use of artillery, or of a horse.

To such theorists a serious reply would be an useless waste of time. We have long evinced a disposition to make our artillery regiments perfectly acquainted with infantry tactics. They are required to be regularly instructed as infantry: our dismounted dragoons were likewise so instructed. But in these measures, we have but confirmed the principle for which I contend, without extending its operation throughout the several corps of the army. The general regulations requiring the artillery to be instructed as infantry, have omitted to require infantry, dragoons, and riflemen to be instructed as artillery. Several corps of volunteer infantry have served during the late war, with great reputation and effect, as cavalry, or to use the more popular phrase, "*mounted gunmen*."

A battle won by heterogeneous corps of this description, headed by such *military chieftains* as we have had, and possibly such as we now have, will count for as much, in public estimation, as an equal conquest, where "Generals of Horse," "Generals of Foot," and "Generals of Artillery," with their several separate and distinct corps of different organization, ignorant of the duties of each other, had all figured in the conflict, and all contributed to the achievement.

If it be admitted that occasions do sometimes occur, to justify a temporary change in the use of the various arms of the different corps, and this cannot be denied, then it must be admitted that each corps ought to be in all respects alike organized. If they must sometimes participate in the evolutions of the line, then should their organization be similar; their officers and men of equal rank, and of equal numbers.

According to the proposed organization, a regiment would embrace an aggregate strength of twelve hundred and ten. This number (making allowance for ordinary casualties, those in battle excepted,) would give an aggregate *for duty* of one thousand officers and men. This organization, I have not a doubt, will bear the test of time and trial in the militia, as well as in the regular service. It will, I trust, be approved for the utility and simplicity which it combines. It professes but little novelty, other than its proposed fitness for every description of force. The number of subaltern officers will be objected to only, I am persuaded, by those who have never witnessed the numerous calls for this valuable class of officers, when actively employed near an enemy. In these situations, I have never seen half as many company officers as I have had occasion for. The number of sergeants to a company, is the second feature that may be deemed objectionable. But this is a grade of non-commissioned officers, of which we have but seldom had a sufficient number. Four is admitted to be absolutely necessary for company duties, independent of the clerk. It is to ensure to each company a good clerk and quartermaster sergeant, to keep the company books and accounts, under the immediate direction of the Captain, and to have charge of the public property of the company, that I have added one to

the usual number of sergeants. The third and last feature in the foregoing proposition, to which any objection can be offered, upon the ground of its *novelty*, is the chief artificer of the regiment, with four artificers to each company. Of these, I am fully persuaded that every officer who has commanded a company or regiment on active service, will concur with me in the opinion, that every company should have a blacksmith and carpenter, with such other artificers as the peculiar duties of the corps should require. A regiment of cavalry, for example, should have a saddler and shoemaker for each company, with a farrier; and strange as it may appear to the advocates of French and British, as well as of our former organization, it is not the less true, that every artillery, infantry, and rifle officer of experience, with whose opinions I am acquainted, concur with me in the opinion, that each of these corps have frequent and almost daily occasion for artificers during a period of war. Where there are forty artificers to a regiment, it will be admitted, that there should be a chief to superintend and direct their labors. Blacksmiths and shoemakers are necessarily occupied daily in quarters, and at every temporary encampment in the course of a campaign, in the repairs of arms and of carriages, shoeing horses, &c. &c.; whilst all the carpenters and other mechanics of a regiment, are often employed in the construction of bridges, platforms for batteries, temporary block-houses, magazines, and stockades, to which I may add, gun-carriages, wagons, &c. &c.; and even in time of peace, a proper application of the labors of the regimental artificers would contribute much to the economical, prompt, and comfortable quartering of the troops, and to their consequent health and efficiency. I may be told of artificers belonging to the Corps of Engineers, and those employed by the Quartermaster General's Department. To this I may reply, verily they have their own peculiar duties to perform, and the peculiar interests and self aggrandizement of their own corps to promote. Let a regiment on the extreme flanks of an army, or in the advance, arrive at a point near the enemy, where a bridge, or a temporary work of defence might be necessary to be constructed without delay; the Chief Engineer or Quartermaster General is applied to for artificers; these, as I have often found, were engaged, or destined for *other service*, which in the opinion of such chief called for immediate attention. But even if such artificers should happen to be unemployed, their commencement of the work would often be delayed until sufficient time would have elapsed for its completion, by the artificers of the regiment, such as I propose for each. These would ever be influenced by a zeal and spirit pervading the corps, which would render them considerably more efficient under such circumstances, than artificers more properly belonging to, and with difficulty obtained from, the general staff of the army. The demand for artificers is always more or less pressing.

The proposed organization is, in all respects, applicable to a state of war. It is equally applicable to a period of peace. But for this, I am aware that the number of men to a company will be objected to as being too great. To remedy this supposed evil, the act of Congress, embracing this organization, would authorize the President to suspend the recruiting service, and reduce the companies to fifty, or even to forty men, during a time of peace; with authority to complete the companies, according to the proposed organization on the approach of war. Be this as it may, it is all important to the army and the militia, that the organization, whatever may be its details, should be the same in the militia as in the regular army; that it should be the same in every corps, and in every description of force: and that when once es-

tablished, it should be subject to no change whatever; or if ever subject to change, it should be only once in four, eight, or ten years: and then, only when two-thirds of both Houses of Congress should concur in the measure. For, until the organization is fixed on a firm basis, the whole subject of our military law and instruction must remain imperfect and afloat, subject to the evils of intrigue and intolerable quackery.

The British Army Register exhibits near five hundred general officers, including those in the receipt of full pay, and such as receive but half pay. It is very questionable whether such an *army of generals* could possibly have been palmed upon even the good people of Great Britain, but for the quackery of creating a long train of general officers, under various pretexts, and for each arm of the service; such as generals, with many lieutenant generals and major generals of *artillery*; generals, lieutenant generals, and numerous major generals of *foot*; generals, lieutenant generals, and several major generals of *horse*, &c. &c. By this species of legerdemain the British Army Register, a few years past, (for I have not seen a late one,) exhibited, to the best of my recollection, 8 field marshals, 84 generals, 160 lieutenant generals, and 240 major generals, making a total of 492 general officers. Let us abstain from such abuses; and, whilst we profit by the good example of our neighbors, let us carefully guard against their evil. But if we *must* have generals of each arm, and if the regiments of each *must* direct their attention exclusively to the limited duties of *THEIR OWN ARM*, then let this description of generals be limited to the grade of *Brigadier*; and let the major generals of the army retain that elevated relation to every corps, which ought to secure towards all feelings of perfect impartiality and mutual confidence. When this characteristic trait of an able general officer, ceases to exist, as it must cease to exist in our army, whenever our generals are confined to one arm of the service, then anarchy or imbecility may be predicted, as an unavoidable consequence. Where there are two or more companies on duty together, all experienced men concur in the opinion, that the service would always be benefited by having a field officer, rather than a captain of equal talents, placed at the head of such a corps or detachment; for such is the deep interest felt, and which should be felt, by the captain, in all that concerns the men of his company, with whom his first and constant cheering prospect of professional distinction is intimately associated, and on whom it often in a great measure depends, that he cannot at once divest himself so entirely of this natural and essential feeling of partiality to the company, to whom he is thus wedded, as to feel equally attached to, and secure the confidence of other companies; and particularly so, when they may have long cherished a laudable spirit of rivalry towards each other. The same principle applies to the command of regiments, when more than one or two happen to be on duty together. Such a force, to be in the highest degree efficient, should be confided to the command of a general officer. And until we are favored with a class of men, divested of the imperfections of human nature, to command our brigades and divisions, and armies, there can be no doubt that our general of cavalry, our general of artillery, our general of infantry, and our general of riflemen, if such be created by law, will contract feelings of partiality towards their own corps, respectively, similar to those so naturally contracted by the captain towards his company. With these feelings the general officer of any one arm or corps would be but illy qualified to command, with effect, an army, or a division consisting of other corps. But when detached from, or not acting in

concert with, either of the other corps, he might indeed contribute to render his own just as efficient, but not more so, than it would be under the present or the proposed organization—where the General is presumed to be alike allied to, and confided in by each; because all are equally entitled to his regard and attention; and he is equally dependant on all for their united exertions in promoting the public service, and in the consequent enhancement of their fame with his own. I repeat, that the General of a separate arm or corps, even when detached from every other, could not be expected to contribute to render his own more efficient than it would be under the proposed organization: for it is an important fact, not sufficiently attended to, but one that cannot be controverted, that the *efficiency of an army mainly depends upon the character and qualifications of the captains of companies, and commandants of regiments*. Without these are highly talented, the most renowned Generals of modern times could effect but little at the head of an army, against the veteran troops of civilized nations. But with companies and regiments ably commanded, much may be effected, without the towering genius of a Frederick or a Napoleon, at the head of the brigade, the division, or the army.

In recording my testimony upon this occasion, I am well aware that I have ventured to assume positions that have never been sanctioned by Governments, or men who believe in the *infallibility of kings* and “*feudal barons*” of the old world, or their servile followers in Republican America; nor am I unmindful of the opposition that awaits me, either openly, or secretly and insidiously. The officer who, scorning the dull drudgery of remaining in camp, amidst the sultry swamps of Louisiana, or the snows of St. Lawrence and Ontario, to instruct and watch over the interests of the men confided to his command, could be capable of abandoning them to ensure to himself the comforts of a city residence; and on the approach of comfortable weather, could return but to profit by the untiring vigilance of those who had remained at their posts, and to filch from them the credit of their faithful efforts in the important, but too often despised labor of *preparation* for battle:—the officer capable of such conduct in war, and who could, at the close of a successful campaign, assume to himself, though in a subordinate station, and never intrusted with the chief command of an army or division near the enemy—such an officer, if such there should happen to be, where these remarks become the subject of discussion, he will not fail to array himself against my asseveration, that the efficiency of an army principally depends on, and results from, experienced and highly qualified captains of companies and commandants of regiments.

An army, with this description of officers, habitually attentive to the instruction of their respective commands, is thus rendered efficient in its component parts; because it is thus made acquainted with the principle of every movement, and of every duty in brigade and division.

That the General, of whatever grade, should be thoroughly acquainted with the duties of every officer and of every corps under his command, is obvious and undeniable; and that he should be capable of transforming, in a reasonable time, uninstructed masses of young men into well disciplined companies and regiments, is equally true; but this work could never be effected or preserved, until able commandants of companies and regiments are formed and assigned to their proper stations.

The requisite elementary instruction for these purposes, is at present obtained, and I trust it will continue to be obtained, at the Military Academy;

from whence able Generals will, in due time, make their way through the companies and regiments to the brigades and divisions of the army.

It is a fact, known to every intelligent and military man in the United States, that a great part of our country, and particularly that on the northern and Atlantic frontier, abounds in natural obstructions, such as deep waters, craggy cliffs, hills and mountains, bogs and thick woods, presenting innumerable narrow passes, where a single regiment of riflemen, ably commanded by another Morgan, such as the revolution and the late war exhibited, would check the approach, or overthrow ten times their number of cavalry or artillery, unable to act as riflemen or infantry. there are other places, consisting of extensive open plains, where a regiment of cavalry would overthrow two regiments of riflemen unacquainted with infantry tactics, or not supplied, in part, at least, with bayonets. In all our views and estimates, however, touching the natural properties of the sections of our country, likely to become the theatre of war, we should deceive ourselves much if we lost sight of the fact, that our enterprising antagonist would not fail to understand, and often profit, by those obstructions and defiles to which I refer, but from which we may reasonably anticipate many advantages, provided our organization and instruction are such as to enable us to avail ourselves effectually of these natural advantages. For this purpose, every corps should be instructed in the duties of every *arm*; and every General should be attached equally to the *army*, but not to any one *arm* of the service. But is it practicable, it may be asked, for an officer to find time for these various attainments? To this, I am convinced, that every man qualified to answer correctly, will answer in the affirmative. The officer qualified to command a company or battalion of infantry or artillery, may, in six months' time, be equally qualified to command a company or battalion of cavalry or riflemen. And when the commandants of companies and battalions are thus qualified for the duties of their own and other arms, three months' more of rigid instruction will be sufficient to qualify their non-commissioned officers and privates for those duties; provided they shall have been previously rendered perfect in those of their own arm. The service will be greatly benefited by the proposed plan, of occasionally occupying the troops of every arm in the exercises of all. It will elevate their character, and enhance their moral and physical power, by increasing their knowledge, and giving them fixed habits of *industry*, and consequent health, individual usefulness, and professional distinction.

The Engineers.—The officers of Engineers should be organized in accordance with the foregoing views, with the exceptions which follow, viz:—The officers should have equal rank and equal chances of promotion, with all the privileges of service, (when not on the special duty of Engineers,) common to every other corps. The officers should compose three battalions. The first battalion to comprehend the Military Academy, to be commanded by a Brigadier General, with one Colonel, one Lieutenant Colonel, two Majors, ten Captains, twenty First, and twenty Second Lieutenants, with five hundred Cadets: the professors to be field and company officers. The second battalion to consist of *the Engineers*, for fortifications; and the third battalion of *Topographical Engineers*: the two latter to have the same number of field and company officers, and of equal rank with the first; the two battalions to form a brigade, and be commanded by a Brigadier General: the whole to be commanded by a Major General. Such officers of the first battalion, as may not be needed for the purposes of instruction, to be placed

on duty with the second and third battalion. Should the proposed augmentation of Engineers and Cadets be objected to, as being more numerous or having more rank than the present and approaching apparent demand for that description of officers would seem to indicate, I can but refer to the recent pressing requisitions from several parts of the Union, with the prospect of numerous additional calls, that the prevailing laudable spirit of internal improvement in every State, present, for Engineers of every description, to show the expediency of increasing their numbers. Each of these officers, as well as each Cadet, though educated under the authority of the general government, and destined for the service of all the States, is, nevertheless, emphatically a citizen of the particular State of his birth or adoption, and to which he will have the privilege, at any time, to return, whenever his State requires his services.

Thus will it be found, that by the proposed augmentation of Engineers and of Cadets, every State may, in due time, be furnished with able Engineers for every essential purpose, civil and military. Topographical surveys, turnpike roads, canals, arsenals, and every other public measure of value, tending to improve, enrich, and embellish the State, as well as to secure it against foreign aggression, will thus be projected and executed by the qualified citizens of each State; and from these and other scientific men, the militia of each State will, imperceptibly and inevitably, receive the instruction necessary to their strength and usefulness.

The whole body of the militia of the United States, possessing the *privilege*, and entitled to the *honor*, of participating in the national defence, may be considered as either *local* or *disposable* militia.

1. *Local Militia*.—Local is a term which I have here chosen, in contradistinction to *disposable* or *itinerant*, and in preference to *sedentary*, (English,) or *sedentaire*, (French,) to designate those sections of the militia of our country, which, from their contiguity to the sea-coast or inland frontier, cannot, consistently with any wise plan of defence, be considered as disposable, or subject to general distribution for the common defence, but which should be reserved for the protection of their own firesides, and the neighboring frontier. The precise territorial limits which should comprehend this part of the militia, cannot, perhaps, be very accurately defined. I am persuaded, however, that the most experienced officers of the United States, regular and militia, will concur with me in the opinion, that during a period of war, all married men, above the age of twenty-six, with all heads of families, if not every freeman residing within one hundred miles of the assailable parts of the sea-coast and northern frontier, should possess the privilege of remaining at home, for the support and protection of his family, until his own, or an adjoining State, is threatened by an enemy; and, even then, the policy of subjecting this local militia to calls, for any other than very short tours of service, and in the immediate vicinity of their residence, is very questionable. Even with this privilege, their exposed position will subject them to heavier burdens of service, and greater perils, than their interior neighbors would be likely to encounter. To obviate every ground of doubt or difficulty, in respect to limits, I propose to consider as *local militia*, not only such as reside within one hundred miles, but likewise all within the several small States bordering on the sea-coast, and those upon the northern frontier, east of Lake Erie; leaving the enterprising young men of the interior, and particularly the bold and vigorous mountaineers of all the Atlantic States, the privilege of rendering themselves disposable, by vo-

lunteering to serve during the war, whenever called on, and whenever an enemy shall present himself.

2. *Disposable Militia*.—Disposable, is a term which is deemed to be applicable to the great body of the militia of the interior and western sections of the larger Atlantic States, bordering on the central mountains, and eastward thereof, comprehending near three-fourths of the militia of such States, to the whole of the militia of Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, and Indiana, and to more than four-fifths of that of Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Missouri. The four former of these States are all in the Union, whose interior position is so much altogether out of the reach of a foreign enemy, as to leave the whole of their efficient militia *entirely disposable*, as neither of these States presents a frontier that can, in any national plan of defence, be considered as within the reach of an enemy, any more than Albany, in New York, or Pittsburg, in Pennsylvania, can be so considered. It may be proper here to remark, in reference to a future plan of defence, upon which my present views are based, that one of the most essential points in any such plan, will be for us to occupy Lower Canada, from Montreal to Quebec, with a force sufficient to cut off all communication between a European enemy and Upper Canada; and thus to secure our extensive northern frontier, and never again should we suffer such an enemy to approach, or gain an ascendancy, on Lake Erie or Ontario. But, to return to the subject of our *disposable militia*. Illinois and Missouri have, at this time, a slender frontier, exposed to neighboring Indian tribes, requiring one-fourth of the militia of each for its defence; leaving, however, at least three-fourths of their force disposable. But the whole of the militia of these States will, in the course of a few years more, like that of the four great interior Western States, be disposable. The gradual improvement of the Indians, in civilization, which is constantly resulting from the humane and judicious efforts of missionaries, added to the measures of the general government, that must inevitably follow, in aid of this successful progress of improvement, tending to secure to the educated Indians the organization and privileges, and exacting from them, the duties of freemen and of citizens, will very soon obviate the necessity of reserving any part of this western border militia, for mere local duties. I am convinced that, at this time, a battalion of civilized Cherokee, Chickasaw, and Choctaw Indians, could be formed, which, with the aid of well instructed officers at its head, and in each company, would, in one or two years, be found as efficient as any rifle corps that we could, in the same time, form out of the mass of our own citizens; and, in the fidelity of such a corps, I should have great reliance. The small States, and such as from their limited or scattered population and exposed frontier, require the whole of their militia to be reserved for their own defence, are Louisiana, Mississippi, Maryland, Delaware, New Jersey, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Maine; with the Territories of Arkansas, Michigan, and Florida. Maryland, Connecticut, Vermont and Maine, may be supposed to have a population, and the two latter an extent of territory, which should exempt them from being estimated as among the small States; but, when it is recollected, that of the two former there is but a small section of either, extending more than one hundred miles from the bay or sea-coast, which presents safe harbors for every description of naval force, and that this exposed sea-coast borders on, and would be likely to be approached by forces destined against the most vital parts of the Republic, viz: New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington City; and when to this

view of the subject, it is added, that Vermont will occupy the principal point of approach from Lower Canada, until we obtain the control of the St. Lawrence; and, moreover, that near three-fourths of the whole boundary of the State of Maine, is embraced in the great north-east salient angle of our national frontier—it cannot but be conceded, that however much the militia of each of these States, have been distinguished for their bravery and patriotism—however willing they have proven themselves to be, to seek occasions to meet the invading foe, whether in their own or in a sister State, it would be imprudent to leave such extensive, important, and exposed sections of the frontier, without a local force of the whole number of their militia, with a due proportion of stationary regulars.

These forces may not, at all times, be adequate to the defence of places approached by large armies, such as we may calculate on assailing us, in the course of another war. But, in such emergencies, we may safely look to the disposable force of the interior of the Atlantic States, and more particularly to the great Western States, for prompt and powerful succour.

The militia of the United States, in the year 1820, exceeded 1,540,000, to which may now be added, the probable increase in the succeeding six years, estimated at 256,000, making a grand total, at the end of the present year, of more than *eighteen hundred thousand* men. Of this immense force, it will be seen, by the foregoing estimate, that not less than one million, may be considered as the *disposable force*, of the Republic. But, should the principle upon which this estimate is based, be questioned, and the difference of age, rather than of geographical limits, be preferred, as the governing principle, we may, for this purpose, divide the militia into two sections, and adopt *twenty-six*, as the maximum age of the junior section, and we should still find our disposable force to consist of but little short of one million, viz: about 900,000 between the age of 16 and 26, and to which we may add all *young bachelors*, between the age of 26 and 45, estimated at 75,000 effectives. This valuable description of the national militia, doubtless merit, and would duly appreciate, the honorary distinction of being placed in the junior section of their country's defenders, where they would enjoy the privilege of being foremost in meeting and repelling the invading foe. The proposed *local force* would, in either case, consist of upwards of 800,000 men.

The whole body of the militia of the United States, being organized pursuant to the foregoing views, should be classed for service. The companies, regiments, brigades, and divisions, should each have certain geographical limits prescribed by law; and every free man capable of bearing arms, between the age of 16 and 45, within such limits, should be enrolled and required to discharge, *in person*, every tour of militia duty, for which he may be regularly designated. Each company and each regiment to assemble for the purposes of inspection and classification once a year, except on extraordinary occasions, for which the constitution already provides. Let men of every profession and occupation, men of every grade of talent, from the divine to the day-laborer, and from the politician to the printer's devil, participate in the national defence—then, will the invidious distinctions and qualms of conscience that may possibly exist, for or against the unavoidable *business of war*, and the *necessary evil of an army*, be removed. If war necessarily tends to bring many men together, and if these assemblages so really tend to propagate vice and immorality—then, who can deny the propriety of requiring a full share of the *talents* and *virtue* of the country,

to be assembled for the purpose of counteracting the supposed evil? Let all co-operate in our country's defence—let all enjoy the benefit, or participate in the odium, of whatever service the public interest may require—then none may complain of, or combine against any particular profession or occupation.

Classification.—The whole of the militia of each State, and of each company, should be divided into two sections, as I have before suggested—the first to consist of all between the age of 16 and 26 inclusively, to be designated the junior section, and be first for duty—the second section to consist of all between the age 26 and 45, to be called the senior section, and to be the last for duty. The men of each section should then be separately classed by lottery, commencing with the junior section, and having five classes in each; for example—the company to consist of one hundred men—the junior section may be supposed to consist of 53 men—there would, in this case, be 53 tickets, eleven of which would be numbered one, eleven numbered two, eleven numbered three, ten numbered four, and ten numbered five. The men drawing these numbers would thus constitute the different classes of this section; the first class of the junior section consisting of eleven men, having drawn number one, to be held ready for the first tour of service, and so on, in regular progression to No. 5, of the junior section; and this should be followed by No. 1, comprehending the first class of the senior section; and so on, in like manner, to No. 5, or fifth class, of the senior section, and from this to return to the first class of the junior section; keeping in view, the equitable principle of detail—the *longest off duty, to be the first on duty*. The men of each class to be numbered, and the tour of each to be fixed by lottery—so that if less or more than the men of any one class, should be called for at one and the same time, it will be thus determined who will be the first for such tour of service. The officers of each regiment or division to be classed in a manner corresponding with the proposed classification of the non-commissioned officers and soldiers; for this purpose a division of militia, (not in actual service,) should consist of ten regiments.

INSTRUCTION OF THE MILITIA.

The officers and men embracing the first class of the junior section, or such part thereof as may be required by law, should be formed into companies and regiments, and required to assemble at such military posts, arsenals, or other places, as may be designated in their respective States, for not less than three, nor (in time of peace,) more than four months in the space of two years, for the purpose of instruction; during which time they should be encamped, supplied with camp equipage, medical and hospital stores, rations and pay, with one suit of clothing, and be governed and instructed with the same scrupulous exactness, as if a powerful enemy was known to be near at hand, and a battle daily expected. At the end of two years, (whether in peace or in war,) the class thus detailed for duty, should be relieved by the next class for duty; and the class thus relieved, should not be subject to another tour of duty, until each of the other classes shall have been called into service.

Each regiment, when encamped for instruction, should be furnished with a capable Instructor, whose qualifications should be tested and vouched by the Assistant Inspector General; whose duty it should be to visit and inspect each regiment, previous to the termination of their course of instruction, at their respective encampments.

It is deemed unnecessary, even on the approach, or during a period of war, to make any provision for the instruction of more than one or two classes at

a time; for where there is, in actual service, any given number of men properly instructed, an equal number of uninstructed recruits or levies, may be added to each corps, and be able to do duty effectively in the course of a few days' drill. None should be eligible to the appointment of Inspector, or Assistant Inspector General, who should not have commanded a company in the actual service of the United States for five years, excepting graduates from the Military Academy, who should have commanded a company for at least three years, before they should be eligible to the office of Inspector, or Assistant Inspector General.

Volunteers.—The many valuable officers and soldiers that have, at different times, made their way through volunteer companies and battalions, to stations of great utility and distinction in the public service, during the revolutionary and late war, demonstrate the propriety of some permanent and encouraging provision being made by law, for this description of force. Volunteer companies often consist of the most enterprising and gallant young men of the learned professions, planters, merchants, and intelligent mechanics. These might, for the most part, find it extremely prejudicial to their various pursuits and interests, to be compelled to leave home for three or four months in succession, in time of peace, for *the purpose of instruction*; and yet they would cheerfully devote that much of their time, every two years, to a course of instruction, within the immediate vicinity of their own town or settlement, (and in war they would still more cheerfully serve in the field for a year or two;) it may, therefore, be deemed advisable to provide for the enrolment and instruction of *volunteer* corps, upon principles different from those suggested in respect to the *classed militia*. An officer or soldier, of whatever class, desirous of forming a volunteer company, should be permitted to confer with, obtain the consent of, and enrol such other officers and soldiers of his own, or other neighboring companies as may be so disposed, and when the number shall amount to one full company, according to the established organization, officers should be appointed, and the company recognized as a volunteer company; and as such, attached to a volunteer battalion, which should form a part of the disposable force of the United States, and stand pledged for one or two years service; and such volunteer companies as may prefer remaining in or near their own town or settlement, during the regular course of instruction, should be allowed this privilege, on condition that they should adhere strictly to the full course of instruction, without the pay to be allowed to the *classed militia*. But in lieu of this allowance, every volunteer company found upon inspection, well instructed in the various duties of the arm, which it may have chosen, should receive the Inspector General's certificate to that effect, and thereupon be entitled to a complete suit of uniform clothing, with such small arms and equipments from the United States, as may be suited to the arm of service to which such company may belong; provided, such arms and equipments should not exceed, in the first cost, the pay of such company during the authorized period of instruction. These small arms and equipments to consist of rifles, pistols, swords, dragoon saddles, bridles, &c. &c.

In rendering my testimony in favor of this description of force, I take this occasion to repeat, what I have more than once stated, that some of the most efficient companies and battalions, and one of the best instructed brigades I have seen in service during the late war, consisted of volunteers: and if I do not greatly overrate the spirit and patriotism of my young countrymen, the time must come, and it may be near at hand, when every young man capable of bearing arms, will seek an occasion to tender himself

to his country, for a tour of military service for at least two years—a time when to omit having made such a tender, previous to the thirtieth year of his age, will become just cause of reproach towards the delinquents, and operate as a disqualification for any office of honor or profit under the State, or the United States government. When this sentiment is found to pervade every enlightened class of citizens—and it must sooner or later be felt and admitted by all men capable of self-government—then may we calculate confidently on having secured that independence so dearly bought by our fathers, and so justly prized by every philanthropist, and every lover of national liberty—then, and not until then, can we assume the attitude of real fearless independence, and proud defiance towards the common enemy of Republics; and prove to the human family of every clime, that *man is indeed capable of self-government*—that self-government is an essential right and a solemn duty, to neglect which is a crime, which should be held as *treason against the great law of nature*, at least, until we shall find *angels* to govern us.

The number of men to be instructed in the manner which I have suggested, should be sufficient, when in co-operation with the regular army, to meet and check the first onset of an invading foe; for much must always depend on the enemy's first reception: if checked, he often receives a panic, which will enfeeble him, while it redoubles our strength and enterprise.

The defence of New Orleans afforded the finest possible demonstration of this principle; and it was this, which must for ever secure to him, who planned and executed the first brilliant and triumphant movement in that memorable defence, unrivalled and imperishable fame. The veterans of Wellington, with their great superiority of numbers, and of supposed practical military science and experience, never recovered from the effects of the first blow, given them on the night of the 23d December, 1814, because it was directed by a head capable of discovering the vital part of his adversary, and executed by men, who had, for the most part, received some instruction, but not more than will result from the system of instruction which I here propose.

The number to be instructed might be limited to one-tenth part of the disposable force of the United States, in every two years. This would occasion an expense of about *three millions of dollars per annum*; beyond the expense of arms, &c. which would be better preserved in the camp of instruction, when in use, and in the adjacent arsenals, at all other times, than they generally are under existing circumstances. Enormous as this sum appears to be, it is very doubtful whether it amounts to as much as is annually expended by the militia of the United States, under the present defective system, taking into view the value of their time lost, and expenses incurred in attending *musters, trainings, courts martial*, &c. &c.; expenses which are, for the most part, incurred without the attainment of any useful knowledge in return; but often with the loss of health and morals, which would not fail to be improved by the rigid and systematic course of instruction here recommended. This view of the subject may appear incredible to those who have been habituated to the persuasion, that the life of a soldier is a life of licentiousness. But the reverse is the fact; and I have not a doubt but that every man acquainted with the subject will concur with me in the opinion, that there was less of vice and immorality in any tolerably instructed corps of volunteers or militia during the latter part of the late war, and far less at West Point, since the establishment of the Military Academy at

that place, than in any city, town, or district in the United States, of equal numbers, and equal education.

The same remark might, without much risk, be applied to most of the regular troops now in service, deserters always excepted; and upon this great vice, it may be remarked that the proposed system would tend greatly to lessen its frequent recurrence. Great as the expense of instruction must be, it is nevertheless a legitimate object of expense, and one that will secure an amount of property and money, (to say nothing of national honor) in the course of another war, which, in a retrospect of the disasters of 1812, 13, and 14, cannot but prove favorable to the proposed measure. The requisite expense will fall upon the rich *bankers, manufacturers, planters, and merchants*, to whom the money will speedily return, after supplying the moderate wants of the volunteers and militia, whilst preparing effectively to conquer the foe, who dares to invade or disturb us. But to the statesman, who may view the expense as an insuperable objection, let me submit an inquiry, to which the public records at Washington must render a conclusive solution. What was the actual expense of the late war, on land, prior to the 1st of May, 1814? What part of this expense is justly attributed to our want of preparation and instruction? A moiety, at least, of that expense must, I apprehend, be the melancholy answer. The proposed course of instruction will not, of itself, be sufficient to perfect the officers or men, in a knowledge of every movement, and of the use of every arm; but it will disclose to them the basis, and the elementary principles upon which every duty depends; and it will enable them to apply, at their own firesides, and at their leisure, these principles, to all the practical duties of the *soldier*, the *squad*, the *company*, and the *battalion*—they will, under good officers, with able instructors, learn at the camp of instruction, the various important duties comprehended in the terms, *police* and *discipline*—tending essentially to preserve the health, and promote the physical prowess and moral power of the troops, by the regular and methodical attainment of knowledge, and habitual vigilance and promptitude in its application, much of which can be acquired only *in camp*, and upon marches, where every principle of military law is strictly enforced.

A few years attention to such a course of instruction would not fail to enable us to calculate, confidently, on having the whole of the disposable force of every State, consisting of one million of brave men, enrolled and instructed as volunteer corps, pledged for two years, or more than two years service, and at a moment's warning held ready for battle.

Our disposable force would then partake of the high character, and follow the noble example of the veteran corps, who fought and triumphed in the revolutionary and late war, from *Bunker's Hill* to *King's Mountain* and *Little York*, and from the *Thames* and the *Peninsula of Upper Canada* to the plains of *Orleans*.

Military Roads and Canals.

Having endeavored to show the practicability of improving the character of the militia, and by a simple uniform organization, with a limited but regular system of instruction; rendering them, in fact, what nothing short of such organization and instruction can make them, the *sword* and *shield of the Republic*, and its surest safeguard in the day of trial; it remains for me to add a respectful suggestion in reference to the measures necessary to en-

able the proper authorities to wield this powerful force, with the facility and *economy of time and money*, which the exigencies of a state of war may demand. For this purpose, I cannot but consider *turnpike roads and canals*, leading from the western, the central, and other interior parts of the States, to the Atlantic and Mexican sea coast, more essential to the great work of preparation, for the national defence, than fortifications designed for the immediate protection of our sea ports: as without good roads and canals, the consequent tardy movements of our force and supplies, would enable the invader to take our fortifications, and turn our guns against us, before we could reinforce them.

In war nothing can be more precious than time, and particularly time gained by means of increased celerity in the movement of troops, acting on the defensive—*thus time is power*. Our numerous militia, with most of our military resources of every kind, however abundant, are spread over too great an extent of country to admit of the possibility of prompt concentration, at any one, or at any ten, or twenty four different points, without much previous attention to the improvement of roads, rivers, and the construction of canals.

It is believed that the expense of transportation, ordnance and Quarter-masters stores and subsistence, upon the northern and north-western border of the United States, during the late war, (including the expense of the fleets of Ontario and Erie,) amounted to a sum sufficient to pay the expense of every canal and road since opened in the State of New York, with those recently planned, and in part opened in the State of Ohio and Pennsylvania. In Ohio, particularly, armies have, I am persuaded, sustained greater losses of health, if not of life, from the impracticable state of the roads, and the want of canals, than would have been sustained in the capture of the whole of Upper Canada, with the proposed improvement of the militia, and of the means of transportation.

Of the habitable and most productive agricultural sections of the national domain, east of Rocky Mountains, the actual *centre* is deemed to be nearly a direct line between Cincinnati, Ohio, and Nashville, Tennessee, not far from Louisville, Kentucky. The strong and rapid growth of the western States and Territories, during the last thirty-five years—since the national executive arm has been put forth for their protection against foreign incendiaries operating among the Indians—warrant the conclusion that the time is not far distant, when Louisville, Kentucky, will become the centre of the whole population of the United States. That thousands of our junior citizens now grown, will live to see this prediction verified, I confidently believe. These great and growing States, (Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee and Indiana,) as I have before intimated, are already prepared to render the whole of their militia disposable, and with the aid of two canals, and three or four good roads, similar to that between Wheeling and Baltimore, these States would be able to furnish, in less than forty days after the completion of the proposed organization, an army of *three hundred thousand men*, together with ample subsistence, and every other supply; and to send it to any part of the frontier, from Detroit to Passamaquoddy—to any seaport in the Atlantic States, from Maine to Florida, inclusively, to New Orleans and to Texas. The whole, or any part of this force may, when duly organized, be assembled at Louisville, within forty days after the date of the President's requisitions on the Governors of States for this purpose; and I am convinced that one-third of this number may be obtained as *volunteers*, upon the principal here proposed;

and moreover that this force, consisting of one hundred thousand men, might, at any time between the months of January and June, be embarked on board steam-boats, (with two barges attached to each,) and conveyed to the city of New Orleans in ten days after their assemblage at Louisville. And this might, generally, be effected without any other means of transportation than could be collected together by an active Quartermaster, in the time that would be necessary for assembling such a corps,—that is, within forty days from the date of the President's requisitions. When the canal now constructing in Ohio is completed, a similar force may be assembled at Cincinnati, and transported from thence to the city of New York, Plattsburg, Boston, or Philadelphia, in eighteen days from the time of its embarkation, upon canal boats at Cincinnati. With a canal from the north-east corner of Kentucky, to the navigable waters of the Chesapeake, a similar force, with every necessary supply, may be conveyed from Ohio or Kentucky to Richmond, Virginia, Washington City, or Baltimore, in less than fourteen days; and with a good turnpike road from Jonesborough, East Tennessee, to Morgantown, Fayetteville and Newbern, North Carolina, a similar force may be marched from East Tennessee, to either of the two last mentioned cities, in eighteen days; with such a road from Knoxville, Tennessee, to Greenville, South Carolina, and thence to Augusta and Savannah, Georgia, and to Charleston, South Carolina, a similar army may be marched to either of the three last mentioned cities, in less than eighteen days; and finally, with such a road, a similar force may be marched from Nashville, Tennessee, to Pensacola or New Orleans, in eighteen days.

To these views, in reference to the defence of the country, it may be added, that even in the possible event of our being able at all times, to avoid war, the canal and roads here recommended will never fail to be worth, for the ordinary purposes of commerce, as much, if not more, than the amount necessary for their original construction. The reverse of this is doubtless true, as regards our expensive fortifications. They are of little or no value but for the purpose of war. For this purpose, however, they are eminently valuable and indispensable; but not more so than the canals and roads here recommended.

Fortification and ships of war, are essential means of security and protection to the citizens of seaport towns and settlements:—*roads* and *canals* are equally essential means of security to the citizens of the interior, enabling them to give prompt and effective aid, in the protection of their frontier brethren, and of their commonwealth: the extremities of the body politic doubtless require constant care, for their preservation and protection; but the body itself, the noble chest, embracing the vital parts, cannot, without great imprudence, be neglected.

All which is respectfully submitted.

EDMUND P. GAINES.

Major General by Brevet Commanding.

Major GENERAL BROWN,

General in Chief, Washington City.

